• Home
  • Start Here
  • Podcast
  • Thinking Bigly
  • Investing
  • Arts
    • Contact/Donate
    • Sign Up
    • Search
    • Privacy
    • Disclaimer
    • Arts
    • Investing
    • Newsletter
    • Theatre
    • Poetics
    • India (1997)
    • Indonesia (1998)
    • Popular
    • Blogs
    • Food
    • Photography
    • Personal
    • Mingle
    • Writer Bio
    • Investor Bio
    • Me
    • Yellow Gentlemen
    • Investment Aphorisms
    • Places in Between
    • Grants
    • Angel Investing
    • Shop
    • Unconference
Menu

Then Do Better

Street Address
City, State, Zip
Phone Number

Your Custom Text Here

Then Do Better

  • Home
  • Start Here
  • Podcast
  • Thinking Bigly
  • Investing
  • Arts
  • Support
    • Contact/Donate
    • Sign Up
    • Search
    • Privacy
    • Disclaimer
  • Archive
    • Arts
    • Investing
    • Newsletter
    • Theatre
    • Poetics
    • India (1997)
    • Indonesia (1998)
  • Blogs
    • Popular
    • Blogs
    • Food
    • Photography
    • Personal
  • About
    • Mingle
    • Writer Bio
    • Investor Bio
    • Me
    • Yellow Gentlemen
    • Investment Aphorisms
    • Places in Between
    • Grants
    • Angel Investing
    • Shop
    • Unconference

Deena Mousa: How Much is a Life Worth? Effective Philanthropy, AI for Good & Global Health ~ Podcast

January 2, 2026 Ben Yeoh

How do you put a price tag on a human life? It sounds like a cold question, but for grant makers, it is the necessary calculus of doing good.

"Every time you choose whether to take a more dangerous job at a higher wage... or choose a house that's closer to environmental toxins but is a little cheaper, you are implicitly putting a price on how much you value a year of your life."

In this episode, Ben sits down with Deena Mousa, a grant maker and thinker at Open Philanthropy and Coefficient Giving. Deena takes us inside the difficult decision-making frameworks used to allocate finite resources—from the "Coefficient Dollar" to the complexities of measuring pain.

"In high-income countries, the question is 'Will AI replace radiologists?' But in a lot of low-resource settings, the question is not whether AI will replace the radiologist, but whether you can access a radiologist at all."

We also dive into the role of AI, why government procurement might be the world's most underrated problem, and, on a lighter note, Deena’s specific writing habit regarding white noise.

We cover:

  • The Calculus of Altruism: How philanthropists use "revealed preference" to value a year of life.

  • The Pain Paradox: Why standard health models struggle to account for chronic pain and suffering.

  • AI for Good: Why the risks of "AI washing" in nonprofits are real, but the potential for capacity building is massive.

  • Systemic Bottlenecks: Why fixing boring government procurement processes might be more impactful than flashy new policies.

  • Life Advice: Why you should probably ignore the advice that resonates with you most.

"Often, the people listening to a piece of general advice are exactly the group of people that should be doing the opposite. They are already leaning too far in that direction."

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.

Contents

  • 00:00 Introduction

  • 01:17 Valuing Life and Health

  • 05:46 Challenges in Measuring Pain and Health Outcomes

  • 13:32 Creative Process and Research Methodology

  • 18:38 Journey and Early Experiences

  • 22:23 Debate on International Aid and USAID

  • 29:20 Impact of AI in Global Health and Development

  • 36:25 Overrated or Underrated

  • 44:59 Exciting Projects and AI for Good

  • 46:14 Balancing Cause Areas and Funding Decisions

  • 58:31 Advice for Aspiring Philanthropists and Innovators

Transcript (This is AI assisted, so mistakes are possible)


Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Deena Mousa. Deena is a grant maker and thinker on global health and development, as well as thinking on innovation and progress. Deena, welcome. 

Deena: Thanks so much, Ben. It's great to be here. 

Ben: Your work at Open Philanthropy and Coefficient Giving and really in Global Health overall requires making decisions about where to direct finite resources.

So at the heart of that, you have to grapple with the question of how do you value life and health? What is the value of life? How do you think about that and even begin to approach that question? 

Deena: Yeah, it's a really great question and it's a hard one to answer in large part because it is so personal and there are so many different ways of approaching it.

There are. Fortunately, some studies and research that we can ground some understanding in. So there are two broad literature on this. One is on stated preference, which is where you ask a group of people or survey participants in a lot of different ways how much they value in monetary terms a year of health.

and this can be by asking them, for example, how much they would pay for a particular drug or treatment, how much they would pay to avert a particular outcome, how much they value particular aspects of their health. And these kind of converge on. one form of the answer, which is, what do people say when you ask them how much they value health?

Then there's another literature that is focused on revealed preferences, which is what we actually do and how much we actually pay when we have to make the choice. So every time that you choose whether to walk home or get in a car, every time you choose whether to take a more dangerous job at a higher wage premium or choose a house that's closer to some environmental toxins but is a little bit cheaper, you are implicitly putting a price on how much you value a year of your life.

And so there are quite a few papers that take a lot of these decisions and try to back out of them, how much people, implicitly care about their life in monetary terms based on the actions they take. And this sort of leads to another cluster of answers. and by looking at a combination of these two research studies, you can get to a triangulation of what is approximately right.

This is of course a very hard question because when people make decisions, they're not necessarily explicitly factoring in all of these effects, and they might not necessarily be accurately diagnosing them. And similarly, in the stated preference, it's quite hard to know exactly what decision you would make when it comes down to it.

So there is quite a bit of uncertainty around that, but that gets you at least to some estimate of how people feel and react in real life. 

Ben: And so in the US when you are thinking about this, either thinking about grant making or in your research, do you have a range in your head that you're thinking about?

I'm aware that it'll probably be different in us, say to Italy, say Nigeria. but do you have a range on what, let's call it a statistical life, year of life or a life year to differentiate it from some other thinking? What do you say? 

Deena: Yeah, absolutely. So one, upfront clarification is that different institutions have different numbers for this and in large part because they're doing different things.

So the value of a statistical life, quote unquote, that is used for example, in the United States when deciding on, health insurance or, healthcare issues is different from the one that you might use in a different country. But that in turn is a pretty different question from the one that we are answering, which is how to allocate our finite resources across interventions that mostly target health and ones that mostly target income.

So we, when we calculate, the value of a particular grant. We have a metric we call Open Philanthropy dollars or coefficient giving dollars now. And that is used to equalize health and income gains. so that allows us to basically compare across health and income increases to figure out how much you should value one versus the other. Though of course the metric of coefficient giving dollars isn't necessarily comparable outside of the institution. It's, not like a, objective dollar metric, if that makes sense.

Ben: Sure, yeah. You can't compare it to what the US government is saying about anything to do with dollars. But even within that, do you think your order of magnitude is about right when you're using this a hundred thousand and, spreading it, they say, that's within plus or minus 20%, That's the sense I have.

Or do you think there's a risk that you are completely wrong on that? And maybe we can think about that because you had a really, interesting essay on thinking about pain and I think pain's a really interesting thing to think about because on the one hand you could think for minor pits of pain we use say aspirins and things and they're really cheap and we don't seem to value it very much.

And another aspect actually, if you ask doctors and you think, oh, this person's in pain, we've got cheap medications, or they're out, it often doesn't. Get into their calculus that much because we think, pain or maybe acute pain is this is not life-threatening at the moment. You'll get round it.

On the other hand, if you speak to some people, it could be, really valuable to try and avoid or chronic pain is, different and it comes in enough and it's also more nebulous because there's some part of it which is psychologically based, some part which is maybe biologically based and they interact.

So I was interested in, whether you've got your reflections on how you've been thinking about pain and, whether this is the type of metric which could be used at all with this, or whether we should really be thinking about something else. 

Deena: Yeah, absolutely. It's, a really good question because I think pain is an area where DALYs get a lot harder.

In large part because it is quite possible, if not likely, that a DALY is not a DALY in all circumstances. You might care significantly more about alleviating a marginal quote unquote DALY's worth of pain. The more acute pain that you are in. For example, and there was one study, that I referenced in Japan that implied that this might be the case.

That the more serious the injury or illness, proposed to individuals, the more that they were willing to pay to avert the same amount of additional pain. And so we don't necessarily think of pain or negative health outcomes as linear. but we might have all sorts of different curves for how much we value amounts of health at different points in our life and at different, levels of discomfort.

so I think this is, an area where yeah, certainly the model and here is six we are using might be a little bit blunt. With that said, it is, like you said, it's such a hard question to answer because a lot of people might have quite divergent beliefs and feelings about what that, what the shape of the curve is for them individually and It would be quite prohibitively hard, I think, to apply that sort of differentiated DLI metric, especially depending on the disease. And looking at how it affects different people in to different orders of magnitude and so on. 

Ben: So does that mean we just have to be really cautious with these type of models and thinking when we come across something like pain or is it a kind of this is the best we have, so even if we're a little bit unsure, it's gonna give us some sort of answer?

Deena: Yeah, I definitely think it's, a good reason to be cautious and a good reason why. The quantitative answer is not necessarily the be all, end all, it's a good heuristic. It's a good guide to break down a problem. But for example, with with chronic pain or with, areas where the DALY figure that is given appears to be a little bit questionable or potentially a little bit too high or low one thing we often do is compare it to the DALY burden we've used for other diseases and just think conceptually about whether this is reasonable.

So for example, we might say, the DALY burden associated with cluster headaches is x. Now let's compare it to the DALY burden that we've used previously for o other quite, painful diseases, for example, is it significantly higher or lower? and this can help us triangulate a little bit, what are we really saying when we're using this multiplier for this disease?

Ben: Sure. And when you were looking into pain and, doing your research on that, was there anything which surprised you around that? Or do you think is actually, this is really misunderstood, we should really clarify this more. 

Deena: I was very surprised by the degree to which we don't really fully understand pain.

We think of pain as a direct response to the magnitude of an injury we receive. you stub your toe, you feel some amount of corresponding pain, but that's not necessarily always the case. The amount of pain we feel can be very disproportionate, either higher or lower to the actual damage that our body has felt.

And so it is like a much more complicated and psychosocial, fa thing and phenomenon that we experience as well, which I think I underrated to some degree. And for example, also our understanding of like chronic pain and how chronic pain comes about, is quite limited. Our understanding of, phantom limb pain and why it only impacts some people and not others is, similarly a bits body.

So I think I, I underestimated the degree to which there are a lot of open questions around the biological components of pain and how pain literally works. 

Ben: Yeah. Particularly in chronic pain. I think the scientists call it heterogeneous. We really don't know some of the causal aspects. So you might present with these same type of symptoms, but the underlying can be completely different.

And we might not even have that big of a clue. And it's interesting maybe making a segue into something where we might think we have clearer numbers around, maybe thinking about the UK or any system which has got a constrained budget. How would you deal with funding for extra money, for instance, for a diabetic versus perhaps a preterm baby or maybe say a rare genetic disease at birth or something like that.

So the overall disability life years, the dalis come out at maybe 20, 30,000 pounds, maybe a little bit more in dollars for the diabetic. So you go, oh that's really good in terms of, life, but the preterm baby is coming into hundreds of thousands of dollars. Same with genetics.

So we could be talking half a million up, up to a million, million or more. And that under kind of pure thinking, just cost benefit or say this. First or the utilitarian kind of goes, it's the diabetic all the time. But then when you ask people, and here in the UK we try and ask people, although we argue about whether this is it, people end up saying no, we think the baby should be worth a chance.

Or, particularly with the genetic and then there's arguments around that. How do you think we should think about that? And do you actually fall on one side of the fence around, how we should make that decision? 

Deena: Yeah, it's a really, it's a really hard question and an important one. I definitely won't presume to be able to give a particular answer or say, necessarily what the government should do in a circumstance like this.

It's an impossible one. But I will say that, the, allocation methods that I'm talking about are. Something that's like quite useful for us in our context as a philanthropic funder who are, have a particular pool of money. We are allocating it across cause areas we are explicitly going into it being cause agnostic and impact maximizing.

So we know that is our approach and aim going in. Whereas a government is in a very different position to an individual donor or a philanthropic funder. And they ultimately are tied to a social contract with their citizen. They're democratically elected, they're intended to serve the voice of their people.

And to a large degree, I think the sort of bare utilitarian calculus needs to also incorporate what people believe, how they feel what their opinions and perspectives are on how funding should be allocated and what the priorities of the government should be. 

Ben: Excellent.

Perhaps you could talk about your creative process or your research process. Say you're picking up a new topic like AI in health or you're doing some of this research within pain. How do you go about thinking about that? And also you've had a journalist background, so you've been interested in stories and the narrative around that.

So I'd be interested if you've got any particular creative process or anything you'd like to share around that. 

Deena: Yeah, absolutely. I picked up freelance journalism, in large part as a forcing mechanism. I thought it would be a really interesting way to. Create a structure for myself to get myself to explore the questions that came up day to day that seemed confusing or potentially interesting to me.

so it, I think has been quite good in that it has given me another lens such that when I read something that is, seems a little bit contradictory or seems a little bit unexplained or intention with something else that I know I have a mechanism by which I can say, okay, I, actually wanna get to the bottom of this.

and I'll go and interview several people and I'll, if it starts to look like an actual story, put together a pitch to an editor who will then, be able to act as like a little bit of a scaffold for me as I go off and explore the question and distill what I what I believe in writing.

And that has been quite helpful in large part because I, have this strong belief that, writing is thinking and, in order to. Be able to understand something very clearly. You just have to be able to write about it very clearly in a way that someone else will understand. and that process I think has allowed me to dive, shallowly into a lot of different areas that I find somewhat interesting.

And, so I'm, really glad that I've that I've been doing that over the past couple of years. I think it's been a really enriching process for me, in thinking about the world. Yeah, I've, oftentimes the topics that I'm looking at intersect somewhat with the topics that, I'm thinking about in a professional setting.

but it's a quite different lens on them than doing, research or making grants. And so I think it's quite complimentary in my experience. 

Ben: And do you like making notes as you go? Do you read and write? Do you write two three hour chunks in the morning? Are you an evening person? There seems to be 1,001 ways of doing it, but I'm interested in your actual process.

Do you write by hand or you, straight on computer, or is it just all completely random? 

Deena: I tend to type and I usually do all of my interviews first and get a good picture of what I think the story is in my head, and then tend to write the draft all at once. I usually like to leave it for about 24 hours and then come back to it fresh and do the editing then, because I often think that you're a bit too close to it when you've just written it for the first time.

So yeah, that tends to be my process and I like to reserve Saturday, Sunday mornings to, write for a few hours each week, which I think has been helpful for, forcing some cadence and consistency. But certainly everyone has their own sort of writing habits and patterns that I think they're so personalized and individual that, I'm not sure anyone's, writing habits would work necessarily perfectly for anyone else.

Ben: I think there's been a book looking at this. And if you look at people who, are thought to be really great, you can find, they work at every single different hour of the day with every single different habits. Although there's maybe at the meta level some quirky things about them, which seem to have a, pattern, although the actual individual quirk is hard to know.

Do you ever listen to music or things or is it like music or, no. And is there anything about your process you think is perhaps a little bit quirky? Like you don't write with a pet crocodile beside you or anything, or? Really, a lot of people seem to be, at least in humanities creators, a lot of them seem to be high on drugs or alcohol or whatever when they write.

But I'm assuming you are not, but, yeah. Anything quirky or do you think you're just normal? 

Deena: Unfortunately, nothing's so out there. I, I can't listen to music with lyrics while I write. otherwise I think the words will distract me quite a bit. But, I do often put on white noise particularly like the sound of rain, I think is helpful for, just being a little bit more focused and concentrated.

No, I can't think of anything particularly weird. I'm a bit, I'm a bit more of a night owl than most people. And so I think often my in spite of plans usually to finish something early in the morning, usually my, most productive writing comes quite late at night. so that maybe is, is slightly quirky though.

I think that's a bit common with writers. 

Ben:  I think not having lyrics is maybe somewhat common, but actually wanting brain music or white noise is perhaps a little bit more uncommon. So that's that's an interesting note. Maybe that's a good segue into your journey as to where, how you've got here.

Because if I read it correctly, you were a teenage medical inventor of some sort, or at least a kind of social entrepreneur back where you grew up and then you did a little bit of a consultancy gig and then have come into that. I dunno, what did you learn growing up being kind of social entrepreneur like, and, any thoughts of that in terms of how you went from there to here?

Deena: Yeah, I grew up, so I was born in the us and I grew up between upstate New York and Cairo. I spent my summers in Cairo. So usually about three months of each year, I would be there. And I grew up with, yeah, a family of much older siblings who I think, really shaped a lot of how I think about things.

And, I think just being constantly exposed to, adult conversations and like around the dinner table. I think to some degree, shaped my upbringing a little bit. I did work with my sister on a solar energy social enterprise in, in Egypt that distributed solar water panels that, heated water for households and also for organizations, around the country.

So I think that was a particularly valuable experience. given the fact that, like you mentioned, I worked at McKinsey as a consultant and now at Coefficient giving as a grant maker, getting some exposure to implementation and to operations was incredibly valuable because I think it gave me a taste of how.

Unintuitive difficult. It is, in many ways actually getting something done on the ground is quite hard and quite hard in ways that are almost impossible to predict at the outset. so in each particular circumstance, something will come up, but you don't know what it is until it happens.

And, yeah, often things take a lot longer than you project they will at the beginning. And I, so I think, that, that's been a really important perspective for me to have as I've, consulted people from mile High and also given grants to operators to be able to understand a little bit, of what they're going through.

Ben: I guess that will tilt you into thinking about impact if you've done social entrepreneur things as a teenager. Is there anything you've changed your mind about then over the years in thinking about it? you hint at one in the sense of actually implementing things always seems harder than the paper because unexpected things always come up, but, any grand ideas where you think, I used to think this, but now I think.

Really it's that. 

Deena: Yeah, it's a great question. I think that is certainly one of them that you mentioned, that, operations is much harder than it looks. and that strategy often, di dilutes the nuances of the details of actually getting something done. I think in consulting, for example, I went in half wondering whether this this common refrain that consultants are just risk management, might be true.

it seemed shocking just because of the sums that, fortune 500 organizations pay for consultants. But I actually think I, I came out of it more positive about the value of consulting, if that makes sense. I think one thing that surprised me is how. Integrated, a lot of our consulting teams were with the organizations where we worked and how almost over time essential we became.

And I think that the scope and scale of that across, industries, across organizations, big and small, across sectors, I think was quite surprising to me. So I guess I came out a little bit less cynical about consulting than I went in, which I I think might be the reverse of what, what happens to a lot of other people.

Ben: it's good because you actually did go into consulting. 'cause otherwise some people would've said, don't do consulting at all. Go straight to making actual impacts. So I'm glad you got something out of it at the high level, I'm interested in a couple of systems piece. So there's been a lot of debate on, for instance, US Aid or even just international aid in general.

And on the one hand you could say we lose usaid. There's definitely some projects which had high value impact. Those are not happening and there's that is negative versus having it right in that world. That counterfactuals definitely negative. I guess some people would though say that there are some projects which maybe not higher return, and we really wanna build on local infrastructure and local projects for people, because there's a whole set of examples when, foreigners go in, try and give money, with good aims and have essentially messed it up.

It's gone to the wrong people. They haven't understood these things, the unexpected has happened. And so that money has not only been wasted, has been wasted, but has been actively poor. And there's examples like that. I don't think there's a consensus answer with within that aggregation. But I'd be interesting from in your reflection this mean that actually it's more important the work that you guys do in terms of philanthropy, because there's a little bit less international aid philanthropy from the government level, or is just this whole idea of aid has perhaps been a little bit more down rated, so it's making your life harder.

I'd be just interested in any reflections on whether USAID was any good pros and cons and how it's affected your work. 

Deena: It's a very timely question. I think there is a very reasonable argument that usaid would have benefited from reform. there, there is a group of people that is or a sort of line of thinking that is, the bureaucratic nature of foreign aid in the US and in other large countries has overwhelmed, the institution and it needed a significant overhaul.

I think I sympathize with some aspects of that argument, and I think it is re reasonable to say that, even a pretty heavy handed, overhaul of USAID could have been good. There is a version of that could have been, very net positive. I think a version that, some have talked about since of, like massive slashes to foreign aid, that are indiscriminate or, just go across the board pretty heavy handedly are.

certainly not the version of, the overhaul that I think, would have been most effective. And I think that is something to note, which is like, there is a, there is a, good and a less good version of reforming usaid, if that makes sense. And I think in a, just the magnitude of funding that comes through foreign aid, in global health and development is staggering.

And losing a large proportion of that really would, significantly alter the field. regardless of the sort of spread of projects. And maybe you can say that the range of cost effectiveness that, happens within institutions, it is just so much funding that it, inevitably leaves a massive gap and a massive hole.

I do think that makes our work as philanthropic funders, more important and more sorely needed. And often opens up, more opportunities for us to do cost effective work. Though it is also of course much more difficult when a lot of USAID programs were supporting foundational infrastructure that then enabled us to build, for example, on top of them.

when that infrastructure goes, in some cases there isn't an actor who is well positioned to fill the gap. 

Ben: So net, net, although reform of usaid, a reasonable person could have argued for that. What we have now in practice is probably net negative because of the absolute levels of, funding cuts and this issue of some infrastructure with no credible stakeholder or actor being able to do that.

So those, not only those first order projects have gone, but a whole infrastructure layer has been, withdrawn, made, life difficult. Was that a fair summary of thinking around that? 

Deena: I think that sounds right. yeah, there is a version of USAID reform that, that could have been certainly net positive, but I think, a combination of magnitude of the cuts and the way in which the cuts were decided, if that makes sense.

In terms of how to prioritize projects and how many people opined on that and how long that process took, I think, resulted in, in less than optimal implementation. And therefore, I definitely do think it was net negative. 

Ben: Another systems piece. Perhaps this is wider in, in thinking around cost benefit type of analysis or at least simple utilitarian thought.

I still think with suffering in the ecosystem around some of the effects that F-D-F-X-F-D-X and SBF had on thinking about that partly because of funding and partly because they were so explicitly we now think naively utilitarian around their thinking. Do you think there's still an echo of that and do you think I, mean I guess this is on some of this, but I think it's wider philanthropy in general.

And we are probably a little bit younger and a little bit more apart from it maybe. Has it made your thinking around that systems piece change or been influenced at any way? 

Deena: it's a good question. much of the fallout of that happened before I joined coefficient giving, and I was very much looking at it from the outside in.

I think coming into my role, I am less of a sort of hard line utilitarian than maybe some say SBF or pure rationalist or pure effective altruist. And so I think I was already coming from, a little bit of an outside in view, and a bit of a sort of more, more sort of mixed perspective, if that makes sense.

I definitely do see it as having shaken up a lot of the effective altruist or rationalist community and a lot of the thinking around it, I think, a lot of people reflect it after that. Which I think is quite healthy sometimes. For sure. 

Ben: Yeah, I'm definitely an outsider looking in.

I think one of the things I reflected on was, what would they call it? Normy stuff. So I now really understand why you just have a regular independent board if you can do it well, because this is the things which gives you distance over some of the things. And when I see things which don't have that, which I mean there's no guarantee, right?

A lot of those things go wrong. But I now understand why those boring, normal measures are put in and maybe there's too much bureaucracy with some of those. But you can see now the counter examples where they failed because you just went on high trust with a couple of individuals with no oversight accountability.

So it was a, win for normal boring covenants. which is which is weird, which is an interesting meta layer. Meta layer thing. Maybe thinking about a meta layer thing. You've done some work on technology and particularly ai, which within say health or climate or a lot of global development is potentially an enabling layer.

Yes, AI in itself might settle certain projects, but maybe it's more importantly is going to enable a lot of other things. So I'm interested in what you think is actually happening within ai. I think global development and health, you wrote a really interesting essay on sort of radiologists, how it hasn't, for instance, there are still a lot of radiologists.

In fact, we don't have enough radiologists, even though. AI is doing that very well, and that's in a narrow thing, but it looks like it could be supporting quite a lot of a infrastructure layer and then into global development in general. has this altered your kind of thinking, and does this mean we should be in investing more in a metal layer, or at least in transforming that metal layer into something practical?

Or is it really the kind of, yes, this is a new technology, but our old models and our old ways of thinking? Just incorporate that and that will just be the same, but with different measurements. I don't know Your thoughts on ai. 

Deena: Yeah, it's a big question right now. maybe I'll start with some things that worry me and then some things that I'm excited about in the area.

So a few concerns I have upfront. One is this idea of using benchmarks to determine how much AI can do in the field or in practical terms. for example, looking at AI performance on a benchmark, or a test related to a particular job. And then to say this means that AI can replace.

87% of people who do this job, oftentimes the map is not the territory with benchmarks. And so there's quite a big difference between the questions on a benchmark and the true process of actually doing a job or doing a role. And usually it is quite hard to come to a like detailed and nuanced understanding of what it really means to do a job and how people spend their time in that role and what are the long tail outcomes that are, come up very infrequently, but are actually quite important to get right.

So I think that is one worry I have with ai. another, I have with AI in development in particular is incentivized AI washing. people are very excited about. Potentially implementing AI in a lot of new contexts and settings, which I think is, great. And I'll, also get to that in a moment.

But I worry about setting upfront too much this idea of we would really like to fund AI related projects. So we really like to invest in AI related projects. And then encouraging, nonprofits, organizations that are doing great work by default to feel pressured to incorporate AI where it doesn't necessarily make sense or it isn't necessarily adding much impact so that they can then say, yes, we are AI enabled, we, qualify for this particular program or this particular incubator.

I think there is always a danger with technology of, implicitly shoehorning it into processes where it is not quite the right fit, because it is the next really exciting thing. and I think, in part, in particular, we wanna be careful as funders in terms of how we are shaping the field in that way, and whether we are driving incentives in a negative direction in that sense.

But with all that said, I think this is quite, AI and development is quite nascent, and this is a really exciting moment for it. and I am quite excited by the potential for AI to increase capacity and throughput at, almost every level of development. I think often, human capital is a constraint for a lot of different fields from everything from, do you have enough doctors to do you have enough people to run the government properly?

And if AI can act as a multiplier on people's time, for example. Increasing diagnostic throughput for every doctor by making them a few seconds faster with each patient. Then I think it could have, significant positive effects in low and middle income countries in particular where, that is really the key blocker.

You mentioned, a piece I wrote about radiology, that was really focused on high income country settings, where the question was will ai, replace radiologists and therefore make, radiology interpretation much cheaper and much faster? But in a lot of, low resource settings, the question is not whether AI will replace the radiologist, but whether you can access a radiologist at all and whether AI might act as a sort of better than the default standard of care option for you.

So I do think the questions are quite different in low and middle income countries, and I'm very excited about, the potential for AI to increase capacity in lower resource settings. 

Ben: So that sounds like we should move quite fast and hope not to break anything as opposed to moving very fast and breaking lots of things.

Deena: that's a very good question. I think I mean I think that there is also obviously a reason for caution in particular because there, there is a sort of paradigm in which if you believe that AI as a technology will get significantly better in the next, let's say one to three years, implementing a, very imperfect solution Now could, this is an example, but could, lead to mistakes that therefore eliminate trust in AI that will then be very hard to win back. Even if in say, three years the models that you're working with are significantly more accurate or significantly better in a healthcare setting, for example.

So I think that is like one consideration, which is that, when you're introducing a new technology, you are setting the terms of people's impression of that technology. and in a lot of cases right now, AI is people's, most people's interaction with AI in some countries is simply as a tool that spams use to send them a lot of, scam text messages on WhatsApp and scam phone calls.

And I think it is important to consider like the. The relationship that you're creating between the technology and the people and to a, I think to some extent the more that you force technology in where people do not organically see a need for it, the more you can sort of risk creating this negative impression and those impressions can be sticky long after the technology itself has changed significantly.

so I think that's, maybe one reason for caution, particularly right now. 

Ben: Sure. I hadn't thought about that. It's very hard to recover from a bad first date is what you're saying. 

Deena: Exactly, yes. 

Ben: And I guess we also potentially move through some one-way doors, as in you do X and it's quite hard to row back from X, but maybe there might be some two-way doors.

I find it's really interesting that the technologists have a. There are different clusters of them, obviously, but they have a different view, from what a lot of the economists and sociologists think around this. And it's really interesting that they're so far apart. But yeah, when you don't have that consensus, it is a little bit tricky.

Maybe we should do a little short round on overrated and underrated. So I'm gonna give you like a little topic. you can pass or you can say neutral but you can say, yeah, I think this ideal concept is underrated or overrated, or we should have more of it, or less of it or something like that.

Yeah. Are you good? 

Deena: Yeah. Happy to do it. 

Ben: Yeah, let's do it. Okay. so the comedy one, malaria nets underrated or overrated. 

Deena: I would say in general, underrated, still, underrated 

Ben: even though we've been going on about them for so long. 

Deena: I think so. I think we are in a bit of a bubble in that, within the world that I'm in and that to some extent that you are in as well.

people take for granted this idea of malaria nets are the canonical, reliable, cost-effective intervention. But I think one that's not necessarily really like common knowledge beyond this sort of corner of the world. And two, there is still quite a lot of need for it. Like it is still, an intervention that can absorb more funding.

And I think, until we reach equilibrium with that, I guess by nature or almost mechanically, I would say underrated. Yeah. 

Ben: So hundreds of millions of dollars of capital could still flow to mal nets and we're nowhere near, reaching that. Okay. Interesting. Good. Climate net zero. Underrated overrated.

Deena: It's a good question because this is such a polarized one. you have almost, I guess in the US at least about half the country feels extremely negative about this and about half the country feels very positively about this. And I don't know, I would almost say as it nets out neutral yeah, I think when I think about each half, I would say, has been overrated maybe in the past 10 years, but in the last, like year or two, I think that has, like the pendulum has swung and it's pretty sharply corrected.

So maybe I'll say neutral on this one. Okay. 

Ben: What, so your, observation is that the US or the world is neutral in it, but are you yourself now neutral or, actually you were saying that maybe the pendulum has swung. Too far. although the world is maybe balanced that actually because of where the pendulum sung, it's a little bit underrated.

Deena: I think. I think, where the pendulum has swung recently, maybe, makes it underrated, if that makes sense. 

Ben: Yeah. It's, definitely a tricky one. I would probably say it's overrated for environmentalist and it's underrated for the average person in America, but, yeah, that's, the difficult one.

Universal basic income. Overrated. Underrated. 

Deena: Wow. Such a good question. I would say almost. Not discussed, if that makes sense. Really, it's gone. I thought this was 

Ben: the Californian solution to everything. I've obviously been misled. 

Deena: I think it disappeared. it had, it's had its moment in, the, presidential campaign a few cycles back.

But I, my understanding is recently, like UBI as a policy proposal has fell out of the popular zeitgeist. I suspect as we think more about AI, labor market disruptions solutions like UBI will have their day in the light again. and I'm quite interested to see how different the reaction is this time around.

So I guess I would say, yeah, perhaps for our current like labor market structure and where we are literally today, slightly overrated, but for potential AI labor market disruptions in the future, potentially a little bit underrated in that yeah, there's not, there's, there aren't a lot of, concrete policy proposals around that yet.

and I'm, I think I'm excited to see more thinking around it. 

Ben: That's very, well hedged on that one. It's interesting to see that it's actually completely di disappeared from the debate from what you said, or in which case, that would make me think it's a little bit underrated, even if it might have been overrated before.

I was reading that in Ireland, they're gonna do a small version of this, aimed at artists. So if you can get on this list, there's a few thousand artists which will have a small artist, UBI. And to your point about job disruption, maybe this is the offset about, okay. Put all of your work illegally into l and s because it's out on the internet, but maybe we'll give you a UBI instead.

Okay. Long-termism or thinking maybe about the very, very far future, is this overrated or underrated? 

Deena: I think in non rationalists and effective ultra spaces, as in for the average person? I think somewhat underrated. I think it's just very instinctively much more salient to think about things that are impacting us today.

Even if, when you truly consider it and when you think about, future generations of, the people you know and your family, you would care significantly more than you do today. I think the average person likely might care significantly more than they do today. if like properly framed about longer term impacts, if that makes sense.

Ben: Yes. But the rationalists themselves maybe think about it a little bit too much. 

Deena: Yeah, I think, it's a a concentrated dose of something that is, not popularly considered in, in most of the rest of the world. 

Ben: Sure. I think they might just go too far. They just, maybe if you get us to think about 100 to 200 years or 500 years, that's something useful.

Once you go out to say a million, all of the math seems to get really screwed because when we're very, not very good with large numbers anyway. Definitely. But very good. Yeah. Okay. Overrated, underrated direct giving. So this is direct giving of cash transfers. 

Deena: Oh, good question. I, guess I would have to say similar to my mechanical answer on bed nets underrated.

Yeah. Build demand in general use. Exactly. still lots of demand and, and not enough supply. So I'll say underrated. 

Ben: Great. Okay. AI existential risks. So a GI risk. Do you think this is overrated or underrated? 

Deena: it's really interesting, like some of the other questions, it depends radically on who you talk to.

I think, if you spend a few weeks in the bay, it will feel like there's almost nothing else happening in the world. Whereas, if you spend a few weeks. Many other places in the country it's a non-issue or not barely something that's even regularly discussed. So I guess I would say, I wish it were more evenly rated.

If that makes sense. 

Ben: Sure, that makes sense. Okay. And Cairo, do you think that's an underrated or overrated place? 

Deena: I would say underrated. I think yeah, often, people don't don't manage to get out there themselves, but I think it's, a city with so much rich, with rich history and on top of that it is a city that is just incredibly alive.

It reminds me a lot in some ways of New York and I'm biased because I've spent, quite a bit of time in both cities, but it is one of the few cities that I think compares in terms of sheer, like volume of people and energy and, like the idea of the city that never sleeps and the 24 hour city.

Ben: Yeah, very intense. I was there once for a little while to go to a friend's wedding, and it did ha it did actually have that New York vibe of everything happening all at once everywhere. yes. and last one on this philanthropy in general, do you think it's overrated or underrated? 

Deena: Yeah, I, again, am biased, but I will have to say underrated.

You go, you're gonna have to say 

Ben: that otherwise you're in the wrong career. 

Deena: Yeah, absolutely. but I truly believe it. when you think about the volume of charitable giving each year compared to, for example, like pledges that have been taken or the amount of money people, intend to give, I think it is quite low.

And yeah, I think it's underrated and I think I am excited over time to see more. Very high salience and very visible and easy, ways of giving charitably for people who, maybe are stopped by a form of decision paralysis or uncertainty. but who would like to give, which, I suspect is, is, quite a few people.

Ben: I'd accept that effective philanthropy is definitely underrated, but I still think it's a potentially a bit more of an open question than I was hoping for about overall giving, which seems to have, a little bit more of a, more patchy history. Although I guess that's why places like co giving and open philanthropy come about.

And so any current projects that you're working on that you're particularly excited by, or things that you have granted to or looked at and when these are really great projects and have now come by because you are, because you've been working on them. 

Deena: it's a good question. one thing I really love about my job is over the past year I've been able to look at such a wide variety of cause areas.

I think I started the year thinking about antimicrobial resistance and, I'm, ending the year thinking about AI for good and I've hit, many, cause areas in the middle. I think I'm, I am quite excited about the potential for AI, for Good. In particular, I think it's a very nascent field and one where it's possible that a lot of the problems that implementers have are shared even across verticals.

whether you're doing AI for health or. AI for agriculture or weather forecasting? I think there are maybe some common needs and challenges. And I'm excited about, continuing to learn a little bit more about the field and thinking about ways in which we might be able to support that, though, that's quite uncertain right now, so I don't, wanna make any particular promises around.

we, don't have an existing program in the area yet. 

Ben: Sure. And so how do you balance out between looking at something like, antibiotics, a MR and. Climate and AI or systems, pieces and things. And you said that the own internal sort of metric is this a hundred thousand in coefficient dollars, which you, seem to be able to, go to, and I guess you're looking for 10 x, five x, a hundred x, that type of, that type of return.

And I guess that's it. You just have to, whatever area you are doing somehow bring it back to these are the inputs and the costs and get to those sort of figures or how do you think about weighing it up and at the strategic level, I guess you've gone development health, ai, also existential risk and some other elements where you're talking about maybe not, some other people aren't looking at it so much and have ideas about tractability or other, but I'm interested in how your own thinking is shaped about what should we work on and then when we work on it, how are we really thinking about whether this is a good idea to fund.

Deena: Yeah, it's a great question. in large part because by nature our time is limited, which means that we can't investigate every cause area. And so making prioritization decisions based on relatively little information upfront, is quite difficult, but a necessary part of the process. I think we often try to split the process of investigating an area into, parts that will allow us to pivot quickly and frequently.

So we might start, for example, with a two day investigation into an area that focuses on one particular crux that could basically suggest that we shouldn't look into it at all. So for example, if there's an area where. It seems really important and really neglected, but we're quite worried that there are basically no solutions and therefore it is totally in intractable, in which case we shouldn't do a full investigation.

we might just spend two days specifically looking at tractability and solutions. so I think that helps quite a bit. And then in terms of prioritizing cause areas, for funding, we do rely quite a bit on this framework of disability adjusted life years and percent increase in income as the sort of north star metrics or heuristics.

and we try to consider three factors, importance neglected is and tractability. So importance represents the overall magnitude of the problem and how many people it impacts. so this can often be dollies in terms of, health issues, for example. but might, go by other metrics depending on the area.

neglected is a measure of how many other funders are working on it and how many dollars are chasing the problem with some sort of adjustment for, what in particular they're working on. And tractability usually focuses on a few specific things that we could hypothetically fund if we were to enter the area.

So we'll try to do direct models of the impact per dollar spent on a few hypothetical grants that we might make in the area to understand whether they might be comparable to the rest of our portfolio. so that is, often how we try to make comparable judgments across very different cause areas, though, of course that is very tricky and there's a lot of, uncertainty there.

Ben: That's a really detailed level of analysis. Do you think it's worth, if you are an organization or even a startup thinking of applying to funders or even thinking of submitting to you guys that they already start to think a little bit in these terms? Or is it just more useful for you to do the analysis on what they would give you and not necessarily say that they've already started to try and translate it into a market size or impact size or a probability of success?

Is it actually helpful if they've already tilted it into your language and thinking, or is it. Better for them to just do their purpose and their things and you do the analysis on top. 

Deena: Yeah, certainly the vast majority of grantees we work with, will not have used exactly our model or not be thinking about things in exactly the same way we are.

So I think that's something that we understand. And so therefore, it's quite important for, us to be able to convert even very different materials into something that makes sense within our framework. I think it is often useful, when, organizations have thought about things in, somewhat similar ways though, if that makes sense.

When they've thought about, this is a really big problem. here, we know the shape of the field and what other funders are doing. we know why we think what we're doing is particularly, effective at solving this problem relative to other potential solutions.

things like that doesn't necessarily have to be. very, quantitative terms or in exactly our language. But I think the general mode of thinking of, here's why we think what we're doing is quite effective is, often helpful for us to know. 

Ben: Great. And couple of final questions leading into the end.

If you are the Ben benign dictator of the United States or the world, you can think about this globally or the us. what one thing, or I guess if you've got loads of ideas, you could do two or three things, would you implement in the world today? 

Deena: Very hard question. As in, any sort of like law or regulation.

Yeah. You're 

Ben: the ruler of the world, so I guess it'd be a law regulation more than more than anything else. But yeah, you can make this law and let's assume people are gonna even follow it or policy. or maybe you could, go the other way, right? You could take away a policy which you think is so bad that actually the, most net benefit we'll get is if this thing disappeared rather than this thing came in.

Deena: Yeah. Is it, too niche and boring to say I would fix government procurement processes in the US and in other sort of high income countries? 

Ben: No, but I guess the, challenge then is, so you think government procurement A is not a, is first of all probably a pretty bad, but b would probably have an impact which is much larger than the average person might think.

Deena: let me caveat that with saying I've certainly not done a cost effectiveness analysis and I've, definitely not even it was just a thing that immediately jumped to mind. I'm certain there are many other much more cost effective things you could do if you were a dictator of the world.

So this is like quite a small petty thing to be considering. But yeah, in large part, I think our ability to, 

Ben: I mean in some ways the US government did have this in mind ish. When they came up with Dodge, they thought, there's something going on here. I know that was only a part of it, so not completely crazy.

Deena: I think it's, certainly at the core of a lot of our ability to get things done. And, maybe this is also maybe again, I'm, biased here 'cause it's something that I personally experienced. For example, when you take public transit and you think about that the magnitude of the budget of the MTA and yet how expensive it is to do any particular project or process to improve the subway system.

and I think this goes not only for transit, but for things like construction, for for almost anything that the government, procures or does or has an RFP for. I think it's a wide ranging problem that impacts a lot of different sort of verticals that we experience day to day, if that makes sense.

Ben: yeah. So when you talk about procurement, it's not just buying supplies it's the building side of things as well. 

Deena: Yeah, exactly. So any sort of like contractor agreements or RFPs. 

Ben: Yeah, I guess that doesn't have a single bullet to it in a way that say if you propose a global carbon tax might or something.

So if you had 10 minutes with the president and they were gonna do the thing, you would implement that, this is the thing you would say, you'd go fix your procurement, fix your building. 

Deena: Yeah. I, don't know. I think it's in part a sort of a funny answer. and in part something that I think is like quite important.

I don't know how much that I would stand by, if I spent 10 minutes thinking about it, which I certainly hope that I would, if I, were, to be dictator for. For a day. I'm not sure that's what I would come out with, but I, do think I do stand by that. It's quite an important problem.

Ben: Yeah, no, I think that, I'm surprised you didn't go for health though, but you won't. Procurement maybe maybe health is even too complicated. Not as tractable 'cause it's too many bits to it. Okay. I'm gonna ask the question in another way, but bring it rather than at the policy government dictator level.

If I give you a billion dollars, which actually might sound like a lot, but actually we know is not a huge amount in the context of the world. And I say, you have to spend this, by the end of the call you have to decide how are we going to do this billion, what would you what would you allocate it towards?

You've got a billion and you can do anything with it. But it disappears unless we use it. So we can't like invest it and save it and do something even better in 10 years time. But what would we do now? 

Deena: Yeah, it's a good question. It's a hard one in large part one because often the answer might be divided into many little grants, but of course if one person is trying to think about how they would spend the funding, then you really just have to pick a few organizations or just a handful of, places to direct the funding. and then the second problem comes in of you get pretty, potentially pretty strong diminishing returns as you give the extra marginal dollar to the same organization, if that makes sense.

so the first, a hundred million, they might spend extremely cost effectively, but the further you go, the further down of the list of projects they have goes and, the more you start hitting constraints, sometimes thinking about like these very scalable opportunities I think there are certainly some organizations that that could take a large chunk of that billion and use it well.

again, bias, but organization, give, I think, would definitely be on the list. give directly thinking about, Gavi, for example. that could use a huge amount of funding. yeah, thinking about like organizations that are, Able to take a quite a large budget and have limiting diminished return as they move down the next dollar.

so I think ideally I'd split it up to at least five or 10 organizations, but I think something like that. 

Ben: Sure. The effective giving organizations like your own and, but then if you had a pet project, so you're not allowed to give it to an organization. And maybe this would be a smaller amount of money and maybe this isn't first order the most effective thing.

What sort of project or areas would you fund about? I think about this a little bit because one of the criticisms around some of this line of thinking is it never really works on the systems level. Although we've slightly negated that with AI and policy and, the things that they're like and sometimes I talk about, or I think about where we've had great social progress, like over hundreds of years progress, Slavery, women's rights, disability rights have come from this systems level change. And this is my art or your storytelling hat on. Because if you don't have a storytelling narrative for some of this, then you don't have that enabling layer at all to get change. But then, maybe that isn't that effective and we have to do it in a different way.

But I'd be interested in your thoughts of that. And did you have any other smaller pet project that you would want to fund? 

Deena: Yeah, it's a, good question. I think abstracting away from. My day-to-day role here a little bit. I think one area that we've looked at this year that I think has seemed quite timely and important is health system strengthening.

And in particular helping, low and middle income country governments allocate their health budgets and their budgets more generally as effectively as possible. I think this is particularly important now given, the perspective aid cuts and potential reductions in budgets for a lot of these countries.

And so it feels quite salient. But I do think there is a lot, of potential benefit in allocating those budgets a bit more cost effectively. And also in terms of, helping with budget execution, for example, ensuring that the budget can be spent, and can, and the money can get out the door each year which is almost an interesting and opposite challenge.

Ben: Excellent. Okay, last question. Would you like to give, any advice to people, listening? So this could be life advice or people thinking about how to give money or perhaps thinking about going into a career, either in terms of innovation research or grant making research, or your thoughts on where you've got to today.

life advice from Deena. 

Deena: Another tough question, I don't know that I could presume to give personal advice. I guess I will say one meta observation that has been interesting and helpful for me is that often some subset of people listening to a piece of general advice, should take that piece of advice and sub subset actually need to take the exact opposite.

Okay. and often it's reverse correlated with who is hearing it. usually the listeners of a particular, or the readers of a particular outlet are quite similar to. The person giving the advice. And so they have like similar inclinations. And so they're exactly the group of people that should be doing the opposite.

They're already leading too far in that direction. So maybe my, meta piece of advice is try, to collect advice from pretty disparate sources and from people that you maybe don't necessarily normally interact with and from different bubbles of the world. I think, it's very easy to end up in like a sort of, relatively small intellectual circle that thinks relatively similar in relatively similar ways.

But, I think one benefit I found of living in New York is that I am constantly exposed in a way that I might not have been in SF or DC to people who are in completely different industries who, have never, heard about a lot of the things that, that I spend my days thinking about, but vice versa have a lot of pretty interesting and pretty different robustly different experiences.

Ben: Excellent. So that sounds like if you are looking for the advice you want, you should actually ignore it and go the other way. 

Deena: Yeah, in some cases I think that's right. 

Ben: advice is overrated. Great. on that note, Deena, thank you very much. 

Deena: Thanks so much, Ben. It was a lot of fun.

In Podcast, Arts, Life Tags Philanthropy, Effective Altruism, Deena Mousa, Open Philanthropy, Artificial Intelligence, AI for Good, Grantmaking, Public Policy, Economics, Social Impact, Global Health, Decision Making, Government Procurement, Nonprofits, Coefficient Giving

Hansong Li: China, Tangut, political economy, history | Podcast

June 14, 2024 Ben Yeoh

A podcast with Hansong Li, a political theorist and historian of political, economic, and legal thought. We discussed a breadth of topics ranging from the Tangut language, Eastern philosophy, development economics, to modern political ideologies and cultural expressions. Hansong’s insights shed light on historical contexts while drawing connections to contemporary issues.

The conversation delves into broader philosophical and economic themes, comparing past and present political thoughts and examining the effects of international aid on development. Hansong emphasizes the importance of learning from history and cultural interactions for a more nuanced understanding of contemporary global dynamics.

Transcript, contents and summary below.

  • 00:18 The Tangut People and Their Language

  • 11:16 Modern Interpretations of Chinese Philosophy

  • 22:07 Global South and Regional Concepts

  • 27:09 Montesquieu and Sea Imagery

  • 32:55 Rousseau's Plan for Corsica

  • 37:56 Economic Development in Northeast Asia

  • 40:34 International Aid: Help or Hindrance?

  • 46:56 Global Economic Thought: East vs. West

  • 56:29 Hamilton: A Political and Cultural Analysis

  • 01:01:51 Underrated or Overrated?

  • 01:06:04 Current Projects and Life Advice


The Tangut Legacy: A Journey Through Language and History

Our dialogue began with an exploration of the Tangut people and their language. Hansong provided a richly detailed account, explaining that the Tangut were referred to by the Mongolians, while the Chinese knew them as the Western Xia. Significantly positioned along the Silk Road, the Tangut introduced their own script, imitating Chinese characters but retaining a Tibetan-influenced grammar and syntax. 

"Learning the Tangut language is fun," Hansong remarked, pointing out its synthetic nature, blending elements from Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan. He also emphasized the diverse cultural fabric of the Tangut, mentioning Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Han Chinese influences, and how insights into their daily lives reveal much about medieval Northwestern China.

In discussing the Tangut’s military prowess and strategic diplomacy, Hansong noted their frequent military victories over the Song Dynasty. He highlighted how Genghis Khan's frustrations with the Tangut contributed to his deteriorating health.

When questioned about the regulatory landscape for something as mundane yet fundamental as opening a bakery in that era, Hansong illuminated the extensive yet fascinating legal codes and contractual details. This granularity highlighted the historical depth and richness often obscured in conventional narratives.

Modern China: Misunderstandings and Moral Vacuums

Transitioning to contemporary topics, Hansong challenged the notion of a moral or spiritual vacuum in modern China. He argued that, despite China's complex relationship with its traditions post-1950s and post-1989, a rich tapestry of normative traditions persists, driven by intellectuals and everyday people alike.

"There is a world full of normative traditions, contentions, and intercultural contestations in China," Hansong asserted, adding that today's intellectual landscape thrives on the interplay of Marxist, Confucian, and other philosophical streams.

Economic Thought and Development: Lessons from Rousseau and Modern Implications

Hansong's reflections on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s plan for Corsica drew fascinating parallels with contemporary development economics. He praised Rousseau's stage-by-stage approach to building economic surplus, emphasizing its relevance to modern East Asian economic models where initial industrial policy laid the groundwork for technological and innovative leaps.

This led to a critical discussion on international aid. Hansong acknowledged its varied impact, cautioning against viewing aid as a one-size-fits-all solution. He stressed the importance of domestic capability in creating surplus and self-reliance, advocating a balanced approach akin to China’s industrial policy.

Western Economic Philosophies: Evolution and Reflection

Discussing Western economic thought, Hansong spoke about the ongoing evolution from 1970s neoliberalism to today’s reflective and sometimes critical stance. He emphasized the significance of considering both distribution and production in economic models, rejecting binary views in favor of nuanced, context-specific strategies.

Cultural Reflections: Musical Theater and Classical Music

We concluded on a lighter note, reflecting on cultural phenomena like the musical "Hamilton." Hansong critiqued its oversimplified portrayal of social mobility and individual heroism, while acknowledging its power to communicate complex narratives. He pondered the power of performative arts in shaping social and political discourse across cultures.

Travel and Inter-Normative Thinking: Life Advice

"Traveling a lot and being open-minded to different ways of life is essential for any public intellectual," he emphasized.

Transcript (AI derived, mistakes are possible)


Ben: Hey everyone, I'm super excited to be speaking to Hansong Li. Hansong is a political theorist and a historian of political, economic, and legal thought. Hansong, welcome. 

Hansong: Thank you so much, Ben. So glad to be here. 

Ben: What can we learn? from the Tangut language and people? 

Hansong: The wonderful question to start us off to start, of course, the Tangut and the word Tangut is the actually was a Mongolian reference to the people whom the Chinese call Western Xia.

And they occupy to the [ ] corridor so somewhere between modern day, [Gangsu and monglia] there were people who basically occupy this very strategic place in what we today would call the Silk Road as we reimagine it. And at the time of course, it creates some troubles for the Song Dynasty because they really blocked the pathway to Central Asia and to Eastern Europe.

We can learn a few things from the Tangut groups. First of all, the way they created their own script in imitation of Chinese characters, but also preserving that [ ] somewhat, it was rather close to Tibetan in, in grammar and syntax, but with a lot of loan words from across the board from Sanskrit, from Chinese.

So it's a very synthetic language, and it's just so much fun to learn. I started learning it when I was 13 or 14 reading martial arts novels, which involved some characters from the re imagined Tangut dynasty, but and then I wondered, I really wanted to know how they spoke and what they really thought and what kind of buddhism did they have and how did they treat people of different cultures, religions and ethnicities, because it was not just a regional kingdom, but there were [ ] medieval Uyghurs the [Hui] people who were conquered and incorporated in there. There were Tibetans, there were more Central Asian peoples.

There were obviously also a lot of Han Chinese influence. And it was a very diverse. And incredibly rich source of historical imaginations. And we can also look into the daily lives at the micro historical level, the way they contracted loans and investments. And my favorite piece of artifact was really just a piece of paper saying all the things you need to start a bakery shop and all the utensils you need and how much it cost it. And of course, you have to rent the room to open that bakery shop. So all the details you need to know about ideas, we would call it high medieval, late medieval Northwestern China.

And their interactions, their diplomacy, their economic life, their total activities it was just a kind of black box because it's not officially classified as 1 of the 24 histories and dynasties of Chinese history for complicated reasons. But this mysterious dynasty really has a lot to offer once you open up this black box and you see all the treasures inside. 

Ben: I mean arguably it was on a par with the Song dynasty. Is that correct? ... the 1100s to 1300s 

Hansong: Exactly and it overlapped with both the northern southern Song dynasty. So it started in the really in the heydays of northern Song dynasty So [they] able to battle off both the Khitans and and Han chinese And then later on, the Khitans were replaced by the Jurchens and the, the Song Dynasty, the Imperial Dynasty, then retreated to the South, but it continued to exist until the Mongol conquest.

And obviously the Mongols had a lot of troubles conquering the Tang groups. And it's rumored, several sources, including some Mongol sources, that Genghis Khan really was infuriated at the slow pace that Which they were [attacking Tangut] territory. The Tangut was really good fighters in terms of military power, not in terms of economic power.

They were probably much superior to the Songs. There were more victories on the Tangut side than on the Song side throughout the North and Song dynasties. [it is said on Ghengis Khan... that] The frustrations he had with his Tangut campaigns might have contributed to [his] the worsening of his own health situations and might have even contributed to his death. And, but of course we can't really verify that. 

Ben: And were there many bakery regulations? Is it like today where you needed lots of licenses and tax inspectors, or was it relatively simple still to open up a bakery? 

Hansong: It involved, of course, the regulatory regimes and and the legal code was extensive.

The Tanguts ... learned from both the Tibetan and [ ] their Chinese sponsors, patrons, peers at the time, and they also compiled they learned both from the [Tang] and the [Song] codes. And to open up a bakery shop, of course, you have to have a certificate. You have to have the permission to do that.

But then the taxes, right? All the the loans, the pawning and the transactions the land. Ownership and all of that have to be sorted to legally and we do have these legal codes, both the code itself and how it actually applied because we have the contracts and the laws and you can compare if in practice, they were really enforcing what the law says.

It's incredibly fascinating that you can do a lot with these materials. Then sometimes you can do with the seemingly richer Chinese sources at the time. 

Ben: And was it predominantly a steamed bread or a baked bread? And I was bread more popular than noodles, or I'm assuming rice at the time.

Hansong: Yeah. Northwestern Chinese. [The Tangut] took over basically the agricultural zone of the yellow river[ region quickly but] they never gave up on nomadic ways of life. They kept herding hunting and other activities, but they also took over the local agriculture of Northwestern China.

And so these are rough. pies with, I I don't think there was a lot of filling in there. But then there is also this question of the evolution of things like. Momo for example, in this Northwestern Chinese dialect, it really just nowadays, it meant just a bun without any filling in there.

But and then what the Chinese would call baozi and jiaozi nowadays are closer to samosa and momo and manti. But all of these words, of course, come from Tibetanized Chinese. Or other like Turkified Chinese. And so all of the new, so you can basically, like an average Chinese tourist would go into these Central Asian or Eastern European restaurants and order by speaking Mandarin.

Ben: What would have been the greatest cultural artifacts of the region in the time? 

Hansong: In the territories, it would be, architecturally, these magnificent pagodas and the imperial mausoleums actually, it's been the government of Ningxia has been petitioning for a UNESCO status for the Tangut Mausoleum, and I was involved in translating some of the documents that was also very tricky, right?

If you want to call it the tombs or mausoleums, and if it's like classifying it as a kingdom or an empire, it also has geopolitical implications hence also political sensitivities. And these are architectural wonders. On the other hand, you also have Buddhist sutras and also block prints, because the Tanguts were very advanced in book printing.

Towards the end, because of a lot of fiscal disasters and also because of the high expenditures on military campaigns it suffered a dearth of resources. So at the time they were using a recycling papers a lot. So in, in towards the end of the Tangut Imperial history, you will see that all the sutra pages were recycled and you would write your personal like diaries or practice your calligraphy or even write out your contracts On the flip side of maybe a sutra or some kind of textbook so it becomes messier at the time. It's a combination I guess to answer your question. It's a combination of textual artifacts and then there are a lot of These Buddhist artifacts these boxes where you will put in a tooth or it's or there, there will be like larger architectural artifacts.

So we, we have a lot of these and also inscriptions and steels and other things spread out across mostly Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Ningxia. 

Ben: And what would have been the dominant philosophical thought of the time?

So there was obviously Buddhist influence, a kind of Tibetan Buddhist influence.

You also had the nomadic people. There was, a spirit influence. And I guess there's a little bit of a, one of those medieval diverse melting pots we would, might say today, but I was interested about that philosophical thought either I guess a little bit is economic military philosophy, but also the kind of [ ] spiritual, how should they live their life?

Hansong: Absolutely, it's also fascinating if I could time travel, I would definitely try to reconstruct a kind of cosmology of the 10 groups, but I also, I guess it would have been a melting pot and even just officially the 10 groups had bureaus, they had bureau, Creative structures, which regulated Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism.

So you have the Confucian academy system. You have a regulatory regimes overseeing the conduct of the Taoist monist. Of course, part of it is also to make sure the religious sectors don't get subversive and they're well regulated. So there's that kind of state to view it through the eyes of the state.

There is that regulatory intention there, but also it says a lot about the prosperity of Buddhism and even Taoism, Confucianism. And of course, at the imperial level, there were all ways. These more like pro harm confusion. Sectors, and there are these more Buddhist state sectors, and there are the more kind of authentic, if not indigenous 10 good intuitions about, we should be more nomadic and less sinicized.

And so there's always this contention from within the Imperial household. Sometimes the the clan, the maternal clans of the Empress would be a little bit more pro Tengu, pro like more indigenously minded and sometimes the male clans would be a little bit more pro Confucian. And then on top of that, of course, you have military treatises, which are also very philosophical.

You have. receptions of all kinds of thinking from the Central Plains, from Tibet, from, India directly, indirectly through Tibet. And so you have this kind of synthetic cosmology in which different sources of normative and philosophical religious thinking would come together. And usually the Tengu are very versatile in synthesizing them and they print all kinds of texts in all across traditions.

And they're quite proud of that. 

Ben: That's a good segue into thinking perhaps around today's thinking, tracing it through a sort of history of economic thought or philosophical thought. What do you think is maybe misunderstood about China today? Or perhaps another way of thinking about it is, it seems to me that an understanding of Chinese philosophy or, different parts of it still seems to be an underrated way or lens [of thinking about China].

You've already mentioned a few the Tao or Confucianism and obviously you've got that through to thinking about modern China today. What do you think are the important to understand about how China's come about and it's thinking tracing it through the history to where we get today?

Hansong: Yes, absolutely. I think there are several intuitive assessments of the situation in China that I think needs to be more qualified or enriched or expanded. And the first is that there is some kind of moral vacuum, a spiritual vacuum if not post 1950s. ... at least post 1989. So this thesis about moral vacuum or spiritual vacuum could either come from neo left reactions to China's integration into global neoliberalism is a kind of discontent with the fact.

And now we only care about the market and no longer about the morals. So that would be one critique. And the other critique is, Oh, you've got, you've lost all of your Confucianism since the 1950s. This obviously is an oversimplification because since I would say since early modern China, at least not since the Jesuits came in, there was this kind of a first and the Jesuit pivot to the Buddhists.

And then they gave up on the Buddhists. And decided to align with the confusions against the Buddhist and talking about the material moment. And and then after that you still have this continued legacy of inter cosmic or inter epistemic contention, which exploded of course, in the aftermath of the Western.

Interventions in China since the open war. And this and then with the the reception of Marxism, you have traditional, and it must be emphasized this, a very heterogeneous traditional world of Chinese philosophies, which shouldn't be too Confucian centric about it the Confucian, Buddhistic other Traditions of thinking heartening back, of course, to the late spring, autumn, early warning states periods.

This entire internal world of contention descent then interacted with, of course, the Marxists and the liberals. And you literally see the receptions being parallel and also crisscrossing overlapping with each other. And we're very much in the aftermath of that kind of molten. Multiplex reception and today, of course, you still have intellectuals adhering to or mixing and matching these very different traditions.

And it's really not the case that you have a vacuum. If anything, you have a world full of normative traditions. Contentions and inter normative, international, intercultural, inter religious contentions. And I think that's a very healthy thing. So I don't think there is a moral vacuum. And I think it's actually a, an exciting moment to look at the ways the Chinese not just intellectuals, academics, but also the ways that people on the middle or bottom level.

Understand and different sources of normative. Imaginations, right? So that is one big thought that I think it's there, there's a lot in there. And secondly there is a kind of post colonial reading of China, or a And also it's not appropriate to say indigenous, but it's kind of NeoCon confusion or neo post-colonial reading of China, as you know now that China's reacting against the whole, the entire legacy of post imperial, then post-colonial, and then post-war liberal international order.

And it's responding to that, reacting against that with his own tradition. But then here are my responses again that the Chinese tradition must be unpacked and and deconstructed. And it's not just about Confucianism. It's a lot of things in there. And to what extent China's opposed colonial has a.

Post colonial mentality, it's certainly strategically and geopolitically identifies with the post colonial moment, but it's also a very special case. So I think the best way to approach the thinking world, the thought world of China today is to look at, first of all, the genealogy of these ideas and how they contest each other in the long duration, not just in the past 10 or 20 years after reform and opening up.

But throughout the 20th century, going back to the late imperial moment but also to be open minded about the many ways that different sectors of the Chinese public sphere part choose to participate in these different kinds of problem consciousnesses. 

Ben: So that's a rejection of both. The simplistic view that you could understand China today just as a post colonial thinking, or also a rejection of just thinking about China entering a free market, neoliberal type of thinking, either way seem too simplistic.

And the best way of thinking about it is still a pluralistic melting pot of many traditions which have been there for hundreds to thousands of years To, to where we are today. So perhaps thinking today and crystal ball into the future, how do you think this might pan out? And maybe we could maybe make it a little bit simpler because you already pointed to the fact that different parts of Chinese society think differently, and you can think about this almost urban countryside, elite, non elite.

Technocrats merchants versus bureaucrats. So it there's no one answer either because it's a pluralistic kind of view of the world. But I guess with the dominant thought on the government side, or perhaps trading merchant side, where do you think it might be going? Is any one of those threads of thought potentially becoming more dominant or some intersection of that where you think this is maybe a little bit misunderstood and seem to be a more dominant piece of thinking which might last for now and into the immediate future.

Hansong: I see the continued relevance and prevalence of this idea that we we're bear, we're torch bearers of this particular socio political economic tradition that Situates us somewhere in as a kind of dual track policy thinking mode and in between big bang neoliberalism and old fashioned collectivism.

So I think that kind of middle ground, the post 1980s, 1990s. Eastern European moment when, of course, China sent economists to the Eastern Europe to discuss what to, what should be done or what is the old Leninist question what is to be done now that we share the kind of global East mindset, we don't want to go back to this basically empirically.

Ineffective mode of collectivist economic production, very imbalanced, very unhealthy, does not even deliver on social welfare that we pride so much we pride our system so much on and but on the other hand. Not only the symptoms of, the old Martian language, the inner contradictions, but not so much.

The, just the state of crisis in a blind and unreflective kind of neoliberalism. So I think it's now become a kind of implicit tacit doctrine that we are somehow a dual track. Political economy, and that's when the state comes in to correct, say, during a crisis panic moment all the prices go up irrationally.

Of course, the state will come in and instruct some state enterprises to lower the prices and to stabilize the markets. So the there was no no, no feeling that this is somehow working against the logic of the market. It's if anything, as opposed to moderate, the irrationality is propping out here and there and not wait until a hundred years when, for the market mechanism to really work out.

And but on the other hand, the idea of the market primacy as the main market. Place for for transactions and as the way to distribute resources. I think that's not going to be shaken. With whichever administration comes in place, which, whichever kind of ideological orientations.

Is taking precedence within the standing committee within the Congress. I think that stands that socioeconomically. We are a dual track political economy. We stand ready to use whichever instrument that will deliver. We will use industrial policy to support new energy, knowledge, technology, Economy based, I know the industry, there is no qualm about using industrial policy.

And so it's, if anything, it's harmonized with the market reform logic. So that's something I see at the end, since you were asking about the governmental side, I think that's going to be like a very. Stable policy, but as for how to interpret that kind of dual track identity, and as for which one to use at what moment, that is definitely a matter of prudential judgment.

And you do see ideologies coming in when the committee members or the, the top leadership. Selectively uses the different elements of that dual track identity to further its own vision of what is better for the country going forward. So it's so I guess it's not purely ideology, but it's not purely like 1 of the 2 political outlooks.

Say it's it's, there is something stable there, but also it depends on the floods and the reflux of ideological leanings. 

Ben: That makes a lot of sense. So in principle, dual track, but case by case, hard to know which track [has most of the waiting and in the moment] 

Hansong: But having, but basing your legitimacy on the dual track identity, I think, I personally find it a better alternative than many others, but I think it provides a source of stability because if you can't walk back on the dual track ideology, [...] Then at least you wouldn't go full mode, [Thatcher, or]

[Reagan] on the other hand, you wouldn't go full mode.... let's return more power to the state. If you can't really say that within the framework of legitimation then if you must provide some kind of explanation for why you're sticking to the dual track identity, then I think that's at least a constraining force and it's a good thing to have it because otherwise you could have much more unstable policies that confuse people and potentially damage the ecosystem that has been built over the past 40 years.

Ben: Sure. That makes sense. And I guess a lot of western thinkers have come out with large, broad based concepts, sometimes geographic or things. The Global South and South Asia, you've done some work on Indo Pacific. But actually, on some of those concepts, Take one, which has talked about when you unpack something like the global South, it seems so much more con complex than that broad based element.

How helpful do you think some of these concepts are? And maybe if we would unpack global South, or we could also comment on South Asia and Indo Pacific, are they. too simple as to actually being potentially not helpful or as a way, particularly for those in the West, or maybe when you're thinking about some of the causes that the global South tend to campaign for is that a useful framework for them for now and into the future?

Hansong: Yeah. Yeah. That's a great question. I think these spatial concepts are becoming more and more ambiguous and fluid. There is a narrow reading of the global South. And there's a narrow reading of the global East and the narrow reading of the global South is the Latin, Latin American, African, Asian solidarity in the 1970s moment.

When these postcolonial states sought statehood and autonomy and self rule and self national determination, UN seats and all of that, they did share and you can All that entire blog, global South. But of course now in that post 1970s moment, what is global South? That becomes more ambiguous and the global East.

Also, there was a narrow definition, all the post Soviet Eastern European or central Asian moment of, what to do now. And do we preserve the Soviet institutions? Do we mix and match? Do we grow food like EU mode? And where are we turning? Is there a third path? So that's a narrow reading, but nowadays you have plural and parallel solutions to that.

You can for example, if you're a post Soviet Central Asian state, you can go to the Turkic coalition. It's not only not yet a Turkic union, but it's a kind of international society. You can go to an Islamic world. You can go to the Eurasian, the Neo Eurasian you can do the Eurasian project of Russia.

You can do belt and road. You can do Shanghai cooperation treaty. You can do all kinds of things. So nowadays it's hard to say, what is the global East? What is Eurasia? What is global South? And it's hard to say what is the Indo Pacific? Because even if you're looking at it from the point of view of institutions, political institutions what are you going to do with South Asia?

And even just India looking at India... western all cruise type of think tankers who would like to simply impose Western liberal assumptions on the largest democracy in the world always have trouble understanding ... what exactly India is doing. It confuses them profoundly because they don't really look.

Go into the cultural aspects. So it, it's hard to pinpoint these concepts nowadays, but to look at them as intersected regional phenomena of intercultural and international development to look at them as for example, to look at. Southeast Asia as a whole, as a source of innovation.

I think that made sense to look at the global south in the South Africa and South Africa's pleading at the ICJ and all the signatories too. South Africa's case against Israel, you can definitely see some kind of coalition building there, and that's most. Around the global south. And then that kind of goes and then it conquered the global north.

'cause all the European states then decided they must side with South Africa on this limit. [At least on the li more limited] limited side of the argument that and then you have China coming and say that we have to go back to the 1970s- mode and say that anybody under occupation has the full right to resort to even violent means to to regain their territory.

And that is a pretty strong argument. So China clearly is also trying to give itself a post colonial, anti colonial identity. So you have these moments where you say, okay, these kinds of regional spatial concepts somehow make sense, but when you really try to pin down where is where it's, it becomes very fuzzy because we now live in a very, we now live in a world of parallel alternatives and all of these overlap is very hard to even single out. If there is a US backyard, a Russian backyard, if there is a region that's dominated by a set of cultural norms, because it's all very fluid. And so we live in this kind of world of of normative and in geocultural fluidity.

Ben: That makes sense. So in the historic moment, the narrow definitions make sense descriptively, like you said, East Asian moment global South moment, post 1970s or post that. But in, in today's case it's much more complex where even nation states have different things going on in them.

I'd like to turn to a couple of pieces of your work, which are I guess slightly esoteric, but still seem to tie up to me. I'm going to turn to Montesquieu and sea imagery. So I was reading that someone interprets Montesquieu as saying his law is like being a fisherman's net. So this idea that often you can swim through it and only big things get captured.

So you go through most of the time and the laws don't really affect you and obviously he was very influential to many legal systems and constitutions like the U. S. Founding Fathers and a lot due to this idea of separation of powers. But I think you've done some work on the sea imagery in Montesquieu.

So what's going on with this, the sea ocean trade and is this a way of understanding Montesquieu and economic thinking of the time? 

Hansong: Yeah, it's of course, it's one of my passion projects and Montesquieu being one of the first Western readers I came across when I was a child growing up in China.

And he's very hard to pin down because Montesquieu is very versatile and is all over the place. It's very hard to know what is Montesquieu all about? Of course, the Americans have a Separation of power in their mind and it's that kind of label Montesquieu Montesquieu wanted to be a natural philosopher.

He wanted to be even an engineer at some point. He there was a famous story where Montesquieu, of course, would go to the school. And we know this from the Asian experience. Teacher would tell you all the, horrible things happening with your child and why you should help the teacher and inculcate and infiltrate the mind of your child at home and make it easier for the school.

Also someone just went up there and asked the teacher, what's happening with my son and the teacher said I'm not sure if you're smart enough. Is really into the natural science. So he seems much more interested in the literature and the humanities. And won't just to hearing this fell back onto the chair and all growing pale in his face, Oh, no, he's not going to be another useless humanist like me.

So he's really he would rather be and a hard Art science professor and not a a rambler about law and philosophy. And and I find some of that, of course, in his early writings on the natural sciences. And he was chairing, coordinating, and sometimes writing natural science words.

And when he was traveling and noticed that he was really interested in the sea, the lagoons, and these water projects, these aquatic engineering projects. And he even had thoughts that he was going to build a machine that takes out all the mud from the lagoon. So that as to so as to facilitate a maritime traffic and trade and on the other hand.

So this is the natural scientific leanings. On the other hand, I read a lot of very classical Western thinking about the sea and land and starting with Plato and Aristotle, they wonder. Plato famously was skeptical of the port. He decided that if you have a port and everybody's coming in through the port, what's going to happen is that you will have a lot of different normative thinking and a lot of ideas of how to live your life.

What is the best way of life coming in? And it will be very hard. Yeah. To to implement what you think is the best form of civic life. So it's very dangerous to have a port. You don't know who's coming in. You don't know what's being talked about in the marketplace once you open up the port. On the other hand, he realized, oh, if we have to have a port, let's have a port.

You have, I have to have some kind of trade with other cities, other polyas. Plato never was that autarkic. He always conceded, especially in the laws, not so much in the politics. That you need to have some kind of intellectual exchange between the police. You need to have certainly some kind of trade as well.

The Montesquieu was living in a moment when commerce was really taking over with the post Machiavellian moment where there was no return. You have to have trade. And the question is how to tame trade and use trade. In a way that doesn't end up in disasters, but actually benefit your physical well being and all the entire health of the civic body as a kind of in a physiological sense as a body politic that the money is circulating through your body.

Rousseau would call it would make the metaphor. The money has blood going through your your body. But if you have too much finance, unregulated finance, it's almost like having too much fat clodding your veins. Montesquieu was already thinking in those terms. He said that Marseille classical, like ancient Marseille, and also in his own time, was it, it's good to have all the ideas coming in and all the different groups and services coming in.

But the question is how do you think about it legally, philosophically in such a way as. To promote and not to damage the health of the citizenry. And so those two strains of thought, his interest in the sea as a natural phenomenon is interested in the fact of human sociability on the sea.

So maritime sciences or oceanography, there wasn't like proper oceanography yet, but some kind of oceanography. And maritime sociability and the political philosophy, legal philosophy of of human movements of people, ideas, goods, materials, tests on the sea or came together and made Montesquieu this this, I think a major thinker of the sea.

I identify him as a pivotal moment in history, political thought. And and I think he really made a huge Impact his nose, his diaries during his voyage went directly into it. So the the spirit of the laws where, you know, the founding fathers of America founding moment they drew a lot of inspiration from it, but I think it really was a kind of collection of reflection on what he saw and thought during his travels.

And he thought a lot about the sea during his travels. 

Ben: Okay, I hadn't appreciated that and then the interlink obviously at the time that to see was so important for trade and trade being the lifeblood of what's going on there. But like you say, needed to be tamed. You don't want it to be clogged. You mentioned Rousseau as well, and I hadn't realized until reading your work that he had a plan for Corsica and its government in the mid 1700s.

And this kind of plan has echoes today about. Or perhaps it doesn't we can discuss that relevant to thinking about what do we do for developing countries? Yes, should other richer nations have a plan for these countries? What should that plan be? Is international aid good or not? Do you wrap it into your own political ambitions... like give cheap loans... buy land... belt and road or international aid or whatever but maybe we could start with what do you think about Rousseau's plan for Corsica in the 1700s? What did that mean? And has that actually influenced our thinking about global development today? And then what people think about, these supposedly less developing countries and what other thinkers should demand or suggest for them in terms of their own development economy?

Hansong: Absolutely. It's a wonderful question. It would allow me to be very honest about it because when I was looking at Rousseau's historical thought on what to do with Corsica, I was completely, my mind was completely filled with development economics as a discipline and my reflections and critiques Of that and my own preference when it comes to thinking about development in our own time.

So I think they're really connecting. It's very personal as a piece of history of political thought. It felt very personal to me. So Rousseau was invited to give a constitutional plan. It wasn't really like a constitution in like strict doctrinal legal sense, but he was reflecting on the situation in Corsica, so it's a very contextual piece.

Not only that we need to contextualize him in that moment, but that piece itself reflects the way he contextualizes Corsica at that particular moment. And occasionally he made the essentialist remarks on the, how the Corsicans are brave and they're just intrinsically good as a people. But of course, you have to say that when you're legislating for them, you're all stupid.

And here I am, I'm your legislator, but he certainly thought a lot about an African. of an affinity with the core students. But more largely, he was thinking systematically and it was thinking he was trying to apply, really what he thought about the the questions bothering Europe at the time, which is the physical, the fiscal and financial imbalance, which Took many years and centuries for France to resolve.

At the time, the question is, are you going to use finance? If you use finance, and if you finance your your military campaigns, are you ever going to pay it back? Is there something else? There's some other way to finance the army is, They're another way to finance these other development projects.

Rousseau's answer is surprisingly pragmatic, but it's also, at the end of the day, I think it's quite radical. He believes that Corsica first of all, since we were talking about the sea, the Corsica is an island. He says you should close it up for a while. Most readers of that piece think that he's autarkic.

He wants to close the entire island to the outside world. I disagree. He clearly, there is a temporal thinking there. He wants to close this, the island to the geopolitical threats for at least a while enough time so that Corsica could grow into an economic not an economic power, but at least grow to a sufficient degree where it would be able to finance its own defense. So in the here and now Corsica should start with agriculture, and that's why people think he's autarkic, but you have to start with agriculture and then go into industries. And for now, the different regions of Corsica, given these different geographical features, they should trade inter regionally.

And if you don't have a healthy cash flow- barter, no but you trade by goods first, and then you can have a currency system. So he's not against currency, he's not against trade, he's not against opening up, he just thinks that you need to do it step by step, stage by stage. And then we're getting very close to the kind of economic development idea there.

And he thinks that you should build up a surplus in course of time, a very rudimentary sense of surplus by agriculture and industry and collect that surplus invested in where you think matters the most and in a sustainable way. The extraction of salt should be very carefully deliberated because there are these easier to extract harder to extract or higher quality salt that you want to export 1 day.

So please try to do it sustainably. There are woods of different calibers. You need to save up the best wood that in the future will be used to construct warships. But for now, you're not having a Navy because you're not there yet. And let's. Use the worst would for just daily consumption. So he's very careful at every step.

He wants to make sure you're doing the right thing so that the plan would evolve into the future. And how does that teach us? What does that teach us about economic development? This whole idea that look at Northeast Asia, look at Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan for a while, when during the cold war They were very much using industrial policy to build up surplus at home.

And then they were using that surplus in a very centralized way. The Republican Chinese government in Taiwan, of course, used industrial policy. Korea, South Korea used a lot of industrial policy to build up the surplus. And Japan, under all the influence from the U. S. Still, it tried to really concentrate its energy on certain sectors and to succeed from that from there.

And China is also a [an example..] China is a great example that we built a surplus from, manufacturing and other industrial activities. And then selectively and concentratedly use that surplus to advance other knowledge, economic productions. And so as to to leap across certain stages of development and to go straight to the more innovative parts.

And there is a certain level of success. Empirically it, it worked to some degree, at least that's from the anxieties we see now with Chinese export of EVs back to Europe that this idea of. Building a surplus investing strategically and then going straight to the more innovative sectors and then while maintaining an overall balanced healthy economic development.

That is very resilient to me. That's very resilient. And it's not just about opening up. And then you naturally see the. Then the resources will flow and the incentives will work. And then somehow in 300 years, it will grow to a some kind of natural, naturally grow into a political economy that you're teleologically determined to be.

There is, there's not that kind of big band full blown. I don't think any economies, even my Chicago teachers, I don't think any of them really think like that. I think there was Rousseauianism in every. Economic thinker of development. So that's what I learned from it. And I think we can learn a lot from Rousseau's thinking.

Of course, it's not just authentic agrarianism. It's very sophisticated in step stage by stage. He walks you by the hand and tells you what to do. And and it's a very open minded outcome there. 

Ben: It's really fascinating. And just seeing how these patterns of economic thought, go back and where they start and how they then express themselves today.

I guess that leaves me also with a couple of thoughts. So one is for particularly the poorest nations is international aid potentially then more detrimental than not, I guess there's a couple of schools of thought. So one school of thought which Deaton, the economist suggests is that if you give international aid, the country itself cannot develop its own... that well, its own infrastructure, its own form of government or institutional capacity. International aid will often misallocate not very well and therefore produce more harm than good. The opposing thought is that. You get there's a kind of hump that you need to get over in terms of some sort of surplus or you need some capital they don't have access to cost cheap call it cheap capital so if you get cheap or free capital from other places you can make really big differences in terms of things and the so that's One blob I'm thinking about and then the second kind of almost riffing off You're saying is I can see the success of so Korea or Singapore and in Japan And then you've got those which look like they might be doing something similar So say Vietnam, which is still a little bit manufacturing But you can see is going up into some higher knowledge even Bangladesh Which has been pretty successful in clothing other manufacturing seems to have other elements going through you parts of India, whereas that whereas it looks like this could be quite hard to replicate in places like Africa, where it's hard to see what even their domestic surplus would be.

I don't know. There's kind of arguments Other side of that. And so whether that playbook will still work for some nations, it could actually still definitely work in places of Latin America. Arguably Mexico is actually doing this similar idea as well. So I guess there's two components because international aid listed on that.

So do you think it will still happen that way? And we should encourage that. Today and where does international aid play if that playbook is the one to follow or not? 

Hansong: Absolutely so the part one of the question is about international aid and I think there are different levels on which we can think about it.

Some international aid is through international, Organizations institutions and humanitarian aid, and that's one thing. There are compensated compensation, motivating international aid. And then there is also this kind of development oriented loans and other forms of aid. And if you're talking about.

Political science literature is on the effectiveness or political economic literature is on the factings of these international aid. It's very context dependent. Once the aid or FDI, in more like classical or neoliberal terms, come in and gets injected into the domestic political economy, a lot depends on the ecosystem in that country and how it's being channeled into the economic lives of the people.

I think it's the aid loans and foreign direct investment, and then they certainly form an important channel through which the initial surplus, the initial capital could be found. But we shouldn't simply. Assume that the allocation will be uniform across the board because it depends a lot on, again, on the ecosystem at home and the ecosystem cannot always be dependent always be dependent on because it fluctuates from government to government from, factors like corruption to simply how favorable it is to do business and invest in these projects.

And from the bottom up, we also see entrepreneurs Either from homegrown entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs with education from abroad who need to then adapt to their home environments. They could also come in and feel those institutional voice when you can't really rely on the government and providing a perfect Martin environment then you can do something that will also alter and hopefully optimize that that environment.

I think a lot of the. I guess the ways that this model cannot be simply generalized and applied in across geocultural regions is has to do with that. But I think the people on the ground and with, if you can negotiate different kinds of expertise is a little expertise scientific expertise and marketing incentives an effective way to negotiate these Different sources of knowledge, so this kind of epistemic synthesis, if it works well, then you can adapt in different contexts.

But I think across the board, what is general about this? So an insight is that you need to before you can strategically invest in anything that then make up your political economic identity to even get to that stage of being able to choose. The Milton Friedman says the free to choose, but you have to have a base from which to choose.

And how do you get that base? Is I think all the African students whom I've come across at Harvard, they tell me that what they envy about, or they, what they want to emulate from like these Northeastern nowadays and Southeastern Asian countries is is to get to that base. And not to emulate or imitate any of these models, there is no such thing as a Chinese, Korean, there's no, no such thing as a Northeastern or Southeast Asian model of development, but there is that sense that you need to have a base and just blindly waiting for FDI to generate the base for you, or to simply let loose your speculative financial system and wait until the free investments from random incentives takes place.

To do the magic of building your base is probably not going to be as effective as if you're also willing to combine it with some kind of industrial policy or some other kinds of planning that of course, should not interfere then with the market mechanism. So it again comes down to if you can do a dual track or multi track kind of development.

Ben: That makes a lot of sense. So that, international aid compensation or humanitarian, whatever it is, can work on a context specific basis, but you need to get all of those things together, but in terms of overall development, if you don't have a base [to] work with some sort of foundation where you're at least neutral or ideally have some surplus, then it's really hard.

So you might be aiming at the wrong question. If particularly for really poor, say African nations where, you know, where they are below that. Okay. So trying to put a lot of this all together So this is impossible task. I'm going to put some things to decide because obviously we got Chinese political and economic thought.

We're going to loosely call that dual track. You've got actually another kind of geopolitical axis centered around that. Perhaps you have Russia, India, Indonesia. So this is one whole axis. I'm going to slightly put that to the side because we touched on it slightly in terms of development economics and Chinese thought.

And then if you put the other side, the kind of Anglo Saxon, Europe, UK America, North America. There's a sense here that there's been a split as well. So I guess we've called it a neoliberal or free market, although they would argue how free it, it really was. And now there's a kind of pushback.

You've got the extreme pushback, which I would say, they tend to call this then, late capitalism or post colonial and leads into arguments around degrowth, which is a kind of very Malthus, Malthusian idea, actually which, we can comment on, but really backs away from economic growth, which is problematic in its own sense, but it's a kind of backlash from some of this.

And then you've also got, even in Western thinking it comes and goes, but in terms of industrial policies, but the U. S. with the Inflation Reduction Act, IRA is a kind of industrial policy piece. Actually, if you unpack it, if if China or Russia announced it, you go, Oh that's definitely industrial policy.

It's interesting that you've had that and some supply side, economics with it. When we stretch it all the way back to economic thoughts, you can go back to Adam Smith, you can even go back earlier to some of the the Roman or other thinkers or trade thinkers.

It just seems that we're having another evolution in, in, in the thinking about what what markets or what capitalism would be. How do you think that that balance is at the moment between the opening up that we had over, the Thatcher, Reagan years Friedman with, much more free markets less regulation, but what do we do with the lifeblood of trade to where we are today, where there's been a partial backlash.

Some of it is still going on. We've got some places which have some industrial policy. We've got pushback on both sides, from left and right as to working out, particularly in Western thought. But if you look at growth today, it's muddling through, it's positive, not as high as it was, but it's certainly not is not yet sort of recession.

And then these are just tensions between free markets, industrial thinking, Or all the way, is that how you would think about that Western part of the world? And do you see that balance shifting anymore into where we see the near future? 

Hansong: It's an enormous question. I certainly now as a now, as I'm pretending to be an international lawyer in Germany, I I always hear this nostalgia, of course, for the 1990s and nostalgia coming from the legal, juridical community is that it was a time when global institutions diffused.

Of course, that meant Western transatlantic values and institutions diffused, but of course it diffused. Until recently only because of this 2 reasons. 1st of all, there is the Western and transatlantic NATO domination in the security sphere. And then there's the economic consensus that free market has 1 and so there are these 2 reasons.

So it values institutions only diffused under these 2 umbrellas now, both are being challenged because with the diffusion of material power and agency no, you no longer have those kind of us Western European led global security system on the 1 hand. And you also don't have this universal uniform consensus that there is 1, only 1 way to advance economically.

So I agree with you that we're not in the complete, moment of rejection of of the post 1970s, 1990s the golden era of a global liberal economic doctrines. We're not there yet, but there's definitely a lot of reflections, as you also pointed out and critiques of that, and both from the left and from the right and part of the critique.

At home across Western nation states especially in the U. S. and Europe with where you, I didn't really see this so called back right wing populist backlash has to do with socioeconomic inequalities and different the hierarchy of priorities when it comes to socioeconomic distribution. So it is fundamentally a question about distribution- distribute distributive justice. Now the right things we have the wrong priorities. We prioritize all of these global projects or liberal elite projects and spend a lot of money on these leftist ideological programs, but do very little about the very basics. If you go to a [poor/run down] in the rural areas of Northern Netherlands.

Of course, the peasants used to vote for the Communist Party, but now they have no viable leftist alternative. So they do turn to the right wing parties for simply the socio economic quest of, more egalitarianism or something like that. And then on top of this kind of distributive discontent, you have a productive reflection, which is holding production constant, we're moderately growing. The question is how to distribute more fairly. You also have this question of can you sustainably grow or even grow further into the future? And then you look at different modes of growth and not necessarily the rates of growth. That transatlantic economies are no longer the sole drivers of innovative economic productions, right? You now have productive hubs, innovative hubs across the metropolitan areas of East, South, Southeast Asia, Latin America. Occasionally also, in Africa, there was a lot of, it's just not as systematic, but there are a lot of these innovative hubs across Africa.

And and of course you still have Silicon Valley, you have Boston, you have Frankfurt, you have other places, yes, but this diffusion of innovative capacity and agency is definitely a fact. So now the question is, are you going to have something to say about production, not just distribution?

Are you going to have something to say about both? And to think about it more productively, I, on the level of production, I think. There is a kind of sober moment where this idea of the, reindustrialization in it may be not in, in the literal sense of it, but it's introducing some industrial policy elements or to think about, is.

Technology uni is technology linear in its development evolution. Do we have different preferences and aesthetic tastes when it comes to what to innovate? If we have scarce resource to invest in Potentially 10 different things, which ones do we care more about at the normative level? And to go back to the Chicago school, if you look at Frank Knight and these 1st generation, 2nd generation, even and even Milton Friedman and certainly higher and others, they draw a clear line.

Between aesthetic taste and market efficiency. And so the whole idea is that only if you hold taste and aesthetics constant, can you have a framework of price theory or can you have a framework of market mechanism to allocate resources effectively? But of course, we have different philosophies of aesthetics.

So I think that- that also means that when it comes to technology there is not a linear progression towards something like a particular kind of AI or something. You can choose what to develop. China chose to invest fully- emotionally also- but also financially in EVs, but you don't have to do, you can do something else because there's only so much you can do with your limited time and resource.

So I think we need to rethink at least on the level of production, what to invest in, which ones are worth our time and energy and thought. What do we care about as a political community? And as humanity as the human collectivity. Yeah. Altogether, but whichever way we go and whatever we think it's no longer viable to simply sit there and say that the global distribution of labor and the way we invest in these alternative projects of economic production is simply.

Something according to a magical algorithm embedded into whatever we received from the 1970s and 1990s global economy, because that has drastically and dramatically changed. 

Ben: I hadn't picked up on that point on aesthetics about having an agreed set of taste, which does it. And actually that you can see in some places, for instance, in the Nordic countries where they become more heterozygous, they just weren't, they weren't as, they were more homogenous than perhaps they had realized.

So with this has produced. Difficulties in terms of setting that and that interesting thing about actually nation states will maybe have to decide what they want to focus on and they can focus on all sorts of things, whether it was, EV or batteries or art or whatever it will be, but they might have to focus.

Excellent. Okay. Running through the last couple of sets of questions, something a little bit more fun for, although also with that it's thinking about Hamilton, the musical. And I hadn't realized in your reading of Hamilton that actually there is, in some ways, if you look at it today in its reading, there's a kind of almost pro Democrat, pro Biden sense to running through Hamilton.

And that actually. It's it can be thinking slightly selective in terms of what you want to emphasize or not emphasize within the musical as well as all the dance numbers and songs and things. But do you think is your reading of Hamilton that its current reading is actually slightly more democrat than Republican?

Does it have a politics to it? And how else should we understand both the songs and the story narrative in the musical version that Lin Miranda did for us? 

Hansong: Thank you for asking that. It's a very fun question. I, my reading is that the Hamilton is A great piece of art but of course it was produced in the late Obama context where a more progressive and appealing sense of social mobility was used to provide a kind of.

Common ground on which we can reason together as as, one American nation. And so the idea is that Hamilton technically it's not an immigrant. If you went from one British colony to another and Lafayette somehow, they like they. A clap hands and they feel like we, we immigrants do the job and something like that.

I'm Lafayette was certainly not an immigrant. He was a French. But this whole, I, this emphasis on immigrants rising right from random, from poverty, all the way to the founding father status and and this kind of heroism in that story of social mobility. A very individualistic heroism and romanticization of social mobility in a pivotal moment in American history.

So that's, of course, a, I think there is that's definitely a, an undertone that a basso continuo throughout the musical. And is it's, of course, a lot of the in that historical inaccuracies come from the book on which it was based. So I wouldn't blame the production team for that, but at least the kind of ideological message there.

That America is socially mobile, that you can be an individual hero from just being ambitious and hardworking. And this idea that Hamilton started with calling his mother a whore and son of a whore and goths and Scotsman. It's not true that his mother was called a whore by in the court by someone who was trying to abuse and and and vilify her, but what's she.

So this over emphasis on him being from very humble backgrounds, but just through his own exertion of energy and and effort rose to what he was. And then where is Hamilton's financial ideologies? Of course, not emphasized. His hawkishness is neglected. So all of the troubling things that still matter.

America today, right? Hawkishness in foreign policy. This trust in, of course, we shouldn't over, shouldn't oversimplify that either, but his trust in them the financial system that he created and all of these are omitted in preference to, to give time. To glorify this individual heroism and social mobility story.

So I, I think that is quite ideological. And then, of course, at a superficial level, we can also look at the way the production team and the actors and actresses literally intervened, lecturing Mike Pence, not that he shouldn't be lectured on, but it just, now that you've seen the show, here is something we want to say to Mike Pence, who's sitting right there and the way they gave free tickets to the Hillary campaign.

It's quite obvious also at that kind of campaign political level. But I care more as a political philosopher, I care much more about the messages it delivers. And. Of course it resonates with Upper East Side, Upper West Side, New Yorkers who see it. But if you go to the Rust Belt, if you go to the Deep South, if you go to rural America and play Hamilton does it resonate with them?

Are you going to use Hamilton to turn around the upcoming election? I am seriously skeptical of that. 

Ben: Maybe not. Although that that doubling down on this idea that the underdog through Just hard work and become the pinnacle of being America is the American, I'm going to say myth in the kind of most positive sense, like every nation state has to have it.

It's missed the British like underdogs and we like royalty, right? And the Americans like this American dream that, immigrants and that. And so it's really interesting the way you see it. And you can see from the outside that's being constructed. And yeah, there is a Democrat slant, but the actually it's, it is a left and right thing.

This idea that no matter how poor you start off with hard work, you can make it to the top, even how mythical in actual practice. That is for the average anyone, but average Americans, that's interesting. Wait, okay, we have a short section of underrated and overrated, and then we'll finish on current projects and life advice.

So just a couple of things random things about whether you think these things are underrated or overrated. 

Sauerkraut. 

Do you think sauerkraut is underrated or overrated? 

Hansong: Underrated because of how global they actually are. And of course, German sauerkraut is overrated, but there is a global sauerkraut phenomenon.

Ben: So that's like kimchi and all the fermentation foods. Yeah. Okay. All right. Global sauerkraut. Underrated. The German version maybe not so much. Great. I stick on the food theme. Rice porridge or congee, do you think it's an underrated or overrated dish? 

Hansong: Overrated in the white rice version of it.

Of course, you can have millet and other things we eat in the north. So I think because of the Cantonese influence, we always think of it as white rice. So again, I think it's. The narrow sense is overrated, but the broader idea of the porridge with grains in it. It's... underrated. The grain porridge.

Yeah. I've been cheating. I've been cheating. It's always the same. 

Ben: Go into politics. On the one hand. Yes. On the other hand. No. So I'll take votes from both sides. Very good. Classical music today. 

Hansong: Today. Yes.

Ben: No, I guess in the, in history, but I guess how we do it today. So is it underrated or overrated?

Hansong: Oh, wow, that's very difficult. I think it's I think it's still underrated. 

[Cross-talk] Neutral. Yeah still under Yeah, I think it's the right amount in terms of the I think it's overrated in the industry. 

In the industry I think the musical the classical music industry is in terrible shape so it it's not healthy but I think in terms of it's impact on the way of the way of thought.

In the way that we talked about the musicals it's underrated because we don't realize how it actually shapes society in very profound ways. But I think the classical music as an industry as a group of people doing what they're doing, I think it's overrated in the sense that there is inflated and it's not it's not.

It's all the market incentives are distorted and you don't have jobs for the musician, it's in horrible shape. 

Ben: Okay. And last one on this, then maybe harking back to Hamilton, musical theater overrated, underrated. Should we have more or should we have less of musical theater? I 

Hansong: think the right amount or a slightly overrated because but I shouldn't say that.

Let's say the right amount, because I think the at least by Broadway standards, I think it's still healthy. Yeah. 

Ben: Yeah. It's still very influential on, on the world. I think that's the one thing about arts and humanities, because we don't realize how. Yeah, so you don't have like in the hard sciences, you don't have exact answers and they change we know in the moment in the context. 

They are so influential on [absolutely] how we are

Hansong: I would say it's underrated in China where I write these musical reviews.

Musicals have not become the standard currency of language or currency of thought In east asia yet. There are a lot of fans because But they don't really delve into the musicals in the ways that musicals are obviously scrutinized and interrogated very deeply in in Anglo American art.

So I think it's underrated in East Asia, I would say. 

Ben: Yeah. It's interesting if I think of performative arts in the broad sense the popularity of TikTok to me. is a slight sign about both the power of essentially performance. These are just mini performances done by individuals.

Some of them are that, but the fact that it draws in such an audience and you have everything from the really banal and not to quite political thought embedded within essentially these performances, they were a form of performance. And I think it's a form of social artifact. Really social media overall, but even in the TikTok form I think it's a, it's a broadly thinking it's a kind of form of art or expression and actually it's a form of social expression.

[So absolutely] Yeah, it's really intriguing. Great. All right. Last couple of questions. What are your current projects that you're working on or anything in the future that you'd like to share? 

Hansong: I'm working on a few projects. One is a global micro history of Shanghai's sand shipping industries in, 17, late 17th to the early 20th century. So from when sand shipping... 

Ben: is that shipping literally gravel? 

Hansong: In this, it started as a way of shipping on sandy maritime terrain. So you could easily run into these sandy rocks and other things. So it requires a slightly adjusted technology when it comes to navigation, but then it got into deep oceanic waters.

So at least start at the start, it was more like on the. In the yellow sea in the northeastern Asian seas, and then it slowly was able to go into the deeper and stormier waters of the South China Sea. The, but it's I also looked at the sociological phenomenon of sandshipping merchants, the way they integrate in an infrastructure.

Urban development in Shanghai. They were financing police stations. They were financing lifeguards along the seacoast, and they were building theaters for the city. And they also were increasing the enrollments of local academies and sending more people to Beijing for civil examinations. These are like, Shanghai is the Gentries who were generous who generated the profit from from shipping and they went to Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, but also just between North and South China.

And then used to use our language of the surplus, to use their surplus to do these projects, these cultural projects, these political liaisons they've built within. And so it's a kind of global micro history of a. Of Shanghai as it turned from the late imperial to the international status.

So that's one project. 

Ben: It's interesting how a lot of these big, important organizations, companies even call them put this, call it civic arm onto themselves as they get to a certain size. Even if you look at a Google alphabet today, they have a Google culture. Thing Apple have the same Facebook meta has the same micro Microsoft of this, the same.

And some of it is now called this. Social responsibilities here, something, but a lot of it is this, you're influencing the humanities and arts for either locally. So local companies always do it in their community, but then when you reach this global scale, because of this interaction of essentially social phenomena, which you then become a part of.

And if you don't influence it or steer it into your favor you're not as You're not thought of as the same as you're not as important. Absolutely. Anyway...

Hansong: As a historian of political and economic thought, I would add that in the early modern moment, the idea of the state as a corpus, as a body, and the idea as a of course the body and the state and the corporation.

And that's how it the, these ideas ran in parallel that the corporation was a corpus and was also a kind of state and the state was a kind of corpus and a corporation. And these three metaphors really were blended since the early modern era, and we're still living in that kind of intellectual legacy and thinking of states and enterprises, right?

We still draw these analogies between states and enterprises, but that's a small note. Yeah. Yeah. And the other project I am working on is a book on the ideas of interpolitical justice. In. In Western Indian Chinese traditions. So I draw from my classical and in analog chronological musings to shed light on how political communities have thought about ideas of justice across.

Territorial and cultural borders. And so it's a kind of comparative and connective a study of ideas of common justice in 3 different thought worlds. And so that is the more theoretical and normative project. And the Shanghai merchants are the fun project. 

Ben: Excellent. Great. And then last question is, do you have any life advice or advice that you want to share?

Maybe advice thinking about being an international public intellectual or scholar or advice on music or the arts or your career or anything you'd like to share with us? 

Hansong: My advice would be just to do a lot of travelings, because I'm a enthusiastic traveler, and of course, to the idea of being open minded to different ways of life, I think it's a very Herodotian anthropological starting point to be, to be in any but of course, certainly to be a public intellectual nowadays you have to be an inter public intellectual.

It's hard to be a public intellectual in the U. S. or in Europe without having something to say or just being able to understand what's happening in Ukraine and in Gaza. So it's no longer viable to be a public intellectual, you have to be inter public, and to be inter public you have to be able to think inter normatively.

How do you think inter normatively between different ways of different cosmological approaches to making sense of what's happening around the world of course learning more languages and talking to people from very different normative backgrounds, and of course to go there and take a look. So it's but it's also not this kind of globalist ideology of, Traveling around and it's, it could be very, it's in China, it's a medieval ideal of traveling around and blending in with with the landscapes wherever you go.

One of my favorite thinkers, poets writers, literati from the Weijing period, late Three Kingdoms, early Weijing moment Renzi, he was famous for having said, I think he said he his ideal life is Huo Bi Hu Shi Shu, Lei Yue Bu Chu. I would rather stay at home and close my windows and read for months and not go out.

Or he would travel around and and and forget to even return. So you can go in between these two modes and but the idea is, That is no longer viable to stick to a very enclosed a normative framework. Now that we have no choice, but to have something in mind about what's happening around the world and all the, and even just locally, how a global divisions of labor are affected.

In our local lives, and how we can no longer take anything for granted without regard to what kind of global understanding. So I think that would be a nice to travel a lot like Herodotus did Montesquieu did, like Montaigne did, and keep a travel journal as I do. Write down your conversations with the locals and reflect on them many years later, show it to your friends and families and hear what they think the more communicative assets to invoke the Harvard Marcian concept to globalize it, because Harvard must distort ethic is still quite limited in my view, but to expand it and have a kind of global discourse assets and do the conversations like we're doing right now with more people.

Ben: That sounds great. Yes. To travel is to learn. With that thank you very much. 

Hansong: Thank you, Ben. It's been a pleasure. Thank you so much. I enjoyed the conversation.

In Podcast, Politics, Life, Arts Tags Hanging Li, Travel, Economics, China, History
Follow me on LinkedIN
Contact/Support