

Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion¹

Larry S. Temkin

Introduction

Equality has long been among the most potent of human ideals, and it continues to play a prominent role in political argument. Views about equality inform much of the debates about such wide-ranging issues as racism, sexism, obligations to the poor or handicapped, relations between developed and developing countries, and the justification of competing political, economic, and ideological systems. Unfortunately, these debates have been shrouded in error and confusion, for few ideals have been more widely discussed, yet less well understood, than the ideal of equality.

This essay is divided into two main parts. In part I, I distinguish between different kinds of egalitarian positions. I show that numerous so-called egalitarian positions are compatible with the central tenet of non-egalitarianism, and suggest a core notion that would distinguish egalitarians from non-egalitarians. In addition, I claim that there is an intimate connection between equality and fairness, and suggest that egalitarians should be pluralists both in terms of other ideals and in terms of the kinds of equality that

matter. In part II, I gather together, for the first time in an essay, some of the central results of my book, *Inequality*.² I introduce my approach to understanding equality as a complex, individualistic, and comparative notion. In addition, I briefly address several questions about which many have been confused or mistaken. These include whether inequality matters more at high levels or low levels, whether variation in population size affects inequality, and whether one should focus on whole lives in comparing individuals with respect to inequality. Finally, I briefly consider a possible implication of my work that would be surprising and dismaying.

The aim of my essay is modest, but important. It is to contribute to a better understanding of the ideal of equality. I do not argue that one *should* care about equality. Nor do I address the question of how much one should care about equality, assuming one should. It seems to me that until one *understands* the notion such questions are premature.

One preliminary comment. The set of issues that most philosophers and political scientists cast in the terminology of *equality*, most economists cast in the terminology of *inequality*. The issues are the same, but there are two ways of talking about them. Thus, the egalitarian's concern to promote equality, just is the concern to reduce inequality. In general, I shall follow the economists' usage, which I find more perspicuous. However, in contexts where it would be misleading or awkward to do so, I shall follow the philosophers' usage. I trust, in each case, context will make my meaning plain.

Part I

Egalitarians come in many stripes. Too many, I'm afraid. There is no consensus as to what egalitarianism is, hence no single position being defended or attacked. Worse, both advocates and opponents conflate equality with a host of other positions. This is unfortunate. We cannot make progress in this difficult area until we are clear what we are arguing about. The main aim of this part is to help rectify this situation. I want to carefully distinguish between different possible egalitarian positions, so that future debates can be more focused and effective. Unfortunately, to do this properly involves some boring taxonomy. Nevertheless, years of reading and lecturing about equality have convinced me that although some of these distinctions have long been recognized,

too often they are overlooked or ignored. Moreover, much needless confusion could be avoided if they were kept in mind. In the interests of space, I shall largely restrict myself to bald—but not, I think, unwarranted—assertions.

A. Philosophers have long distinguished between purely *formal* principles of equality and *substantive* principles of equality, where, roughly, a formal principle is one that demands *universality* in its application, while a substantive principle is one that demands that people be treated equally in certain respects. Unfortunately, this distinction is neither as clean, nor as helpful as one might hope. Many positions meet the criteria of both formal and substantive principles of equality, and among positions that meet the stated criterion of a substantive principle of equality, some are associated with a deep and thoroughgoing commitment to equality, while others are not. Consequently, it may be useful to distinguish between *equality as universality* principles, *equality as impartiality* principles, and *equality as comparability* principles.

Roughly, equality as universality reflects the view that all reasons and principles must be universal in their application. The view that all blue-eyed people should be made kings, and all brown-eyed people paupers meets the equality as universality criterion! So too would the more restricted view that all blue-eyed people named Temkin should be made kings, and all brown-eyed people not named Temkin paupers. Thus, no matter how inegalitarian a view may be in its motivation and implications, all that matters for a view to be egalitarian in *this* sense is that it apply universally. Equality as universality corresponds to the notion of pure formal equality noted above. It is widely regarded as a basic principle of rationality.

Equality as impartiality reflects the view that all people must be treated impartially. Of course, positions can vary dramatically in their understanding of what treating people impartially requires. Kantians believe we treat people impartially by treating them all as ends, and never merely as means. Utilitarians believe we treat all impartially when we count each person's interests as of equal weight in deciding what maximizes the good. Certain Marxists believe we treat all impartially by following the dictum "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." Though each of these views has its own conception of impartiality, each is committed to treating people equally in the sense of being impartial between them. Note, those committed to equality

as impartiality will also (tend to) be committed to equality as universality, but the reverse need not hold.

Equality as comparability reflects a different kind of commitment to equality. Equality as comparability reflects a fundamental concern with how people fare *relative to others*. More particularly, I believe the fundamental view underlying equality as comparability is that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Importantly, those committed to equality as comparability will also be committed to both equality as impartiality and equality as universality, but their substantive views extend significantly beyond a concern for universality or impartiality. Correspondingly, many committed to equality as universality or equality as impartiality lack the concern for equality as comparability. Thus, one might say that equality as comparability reflects a deeper and more thoroughgoing commitment to equality than either equality as universality or equality as impartiality. Such a view reflects a significant and distinctive commitment to equality as an independent substantive ideal.

To see the value of these distinctions, let us consider some claims of Amartya Sen, one of the most thoughtful and influential writers on equality.

Most philosophical discussions of equality have focused on two questions: Is equality really desirable? And what kind of equality should we seek—that is, insofar as we are egalitarians, should we want equality of opportunity, primary goods, need satisfaction, welfare, or what? Sen has suggested that only the second question is really in doubt. According to Sen, virtually all moral theories “want equality of *something*,” what they differ about is “equality of *what*?” Thus, “income-egalitarians...demand equal incomes,...welfare-egalitarians...equal welfare levels,...classical utilitarians...equal weights on the utilities of all, and...libertarians...equality with respect to...rights and liberties.”³

Sen’s view is interesting and important. Yet many will find it hard to believe that utilitarianism and libertarianism—two views most widely associated with non-egalitarianism—are in fact egalitarian positions. Indeed, it seems clear that there is something distinctive about positions like income-egalitarianism, primary goods-egalitarianism, or welfare-egalitarianism, and that such positions share a spirit or focus that is *fundamentally* different from that of utilitarianism or libertarianism.

So what are we to make of Sen’s claims? I think Sen is right that there are important senses in which virtually all contempo-

rary moral views incorporate commitments to equality. But what they are committed to are equality as universality and equality as impartiality. They are *not* all committed to equality as comparability. Indeed, notoriously, both permit gross inequalities between better- and worse-off. The utilitarian's fundamental concern is to maximize utility; the libertarian's fundamental concern is for people to act freely, without interference, as long as they respect the rights and liberties of others. Neither has a fundamental concern for how people fare *relative to others*.

Aristotle's famous principle of equality, that likes should be treated alike, and unalikes should be treated unlike, has long been regarded as a merely formal principle of equality. It corresponds to what I have called equality as universality. By itself, such a principle tells us nothing about how "likes" or "unalikes" should actually be treated, it is not committed to treating all people impartially, and it neither approves, nor condemns, some being worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own.

The widely-held view that all person's should be treated with equal consideration and respect⁴ expresses a commitment to equality as universality, but it is not just a formal principle like Aristotle's. It is also a substantive principle of equality, in that it expresses a commitment to impartiality that Aristotle's principle lacks. Still, by itself, the view is sufficiently broad as to be compatible with any moral principle that insists on impartiality, and so might be endorsed by such diverse positions as Kantianism, utilitarianism, Marxism, or libertarianism. Correspondingly, while such a position is compatible with equality as comparability, it does not entail it. Thus, it need not reflect the distinctive thoroughgoing commitment to equality expressed by equality as comparability.

Virtually all agree that equality as universality is necessary as a condition of rationality. And virtually all contemporary theorists agree that equality as impartiality is a requirement of any plausible moral principle. But whether a further, deeper, commitment to a distinctive principle of equality as comparability is desirable remains highly disputed.

B. Let us next distinguish between *instrumental egalitarianism* and *non-instrumental egalitarianism*. On instrumental egalitarianism, equality is extrinsically valuable—that is, valuable because it promotes some other valuable ideal. On non-instrumental egalitarianism equality is intrinsically valuable—that is, valuable in

itself, over and above the extent to which it promotes other ideals. On instrumental egalitarianism, the value of equality is derivative from the value of the ideal it promotes. Thus, the ideal of equality does not play a fundamental role in one's account of the moral realm. On non-instrumental egalitarianism, equality is a distinct moral ideal with independent normative significance. Thus, a complete account of the moral realm must allow for equality's value.

Non-egalitarians can readily admit that equality sometimes promotes other desirable ideals. Their central tenet is that equality is not a *fundamental* ideal. Those who would refute the non-egalitarian must endorse non-instrumental egalitarianism.

Unfortunately, failure to recognize the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental egalitarianism is responsible for much confusion regarding the nature and value of equality. Many who think of themselves as egalitarians are in fact only instrumental egalitarians, though they may not realize this. Moreover, they believe, wrongly, that a defense of instrumental egalitarianism is sufficient to refute non-egalitarians. Similarly, many non-egalitarians are in fact instrumental egalitarians, but they think, wrongly, that they must reject the arguments of instrumental egalitarians if they want to remain non-egalitarians.

Defending an instrumental egalitarian position requires two moves: a defense of the ideal that equality is purportedly promoting, and a defense of the claim that in certain circumstances equality promotes that ideal. Neither move has *any* bearing on whether equality is a fundamental ideal. The first involves a normative claim about the value of an ideal *other* than equality; the second strictly involves an empirical fact. Thus, one hoping to respond to the non-egalitarian's central tenet in fact gains nothing by supporting instrumental egalitarianism.

Let me illustrate some of these claims. Many people argue *for* equality—and in so doing think of themselves as opposing non-egalitarianism—because they favor significant redistribution from the better- to worse-off. But the *reasons* they have for favoring such redistribution vary markedly, and may have nothing to do with a concern for *equality itself*. For example, some favor such transfers for *humanitarian* reasons—they favor equality *solely* as a means of reducing suffering, and given the choice between redistribution from the better- to worse-off, and identical gains for the worse-off with equal, or even greater, gains for the better-off, they would see *no* reason to favor the former over the latter. Such people are instrumental egalitarians, rather than non-instrumental

egalitarians. Their position offers no more support of equality as an independent ideal than utilitarianism, which, of course, also favors transfers from better- to worse-off on all and only those occasions that maximize utility. Similarly, some would favor transfers from better- to worse-off as a way of promoting *freedom*—they believe that genuine freedom involves the autonomous formulation and effective implementation of a meaningful life plan, and this requires satisfaction of one's basic needs, acceptable levels of resources or primary goods, and freedom from social, economic, and political coercion of a sort incompatible with great inequality. And the list goes on. Socialists, capitalists, communitarians, and others all might favor redistribution from better- to worse-off purely for instrumental reasons.

Instrumental reasons for promoting equality may have tremendous moral significance—but, as noted, they do not support the value of equality *per se*. Unfortunately, many have not recognized this, and thus concern for equality is often conflated with other concerns that equality may, under certain circumstances, promote. One striking example of this is Rawls's maximin principle, which requires that we maximize the expectations of the representative member of the worst-off group.⁵ Maximin is widely regarded as an egalitarian principle, and many who accept maximin think of themselves as egalitarians. Yet maximin is concerned with how well off the worst-off fare, it is *not* concerned with how the worst-off fare *relative to others*. Thus, maximin licenses vast *increases* in inequality, if necessary for improving—however slightly—the worst-off. Of course, in most cases promoting equality *will* improve a situation according to maximin. Hence maximin *is* plausible as an instrumental egalitarian position. Moreover, like most plausible moral principles—maximin is acceptable both as a principle of equality as universality, and also as a principle of equality as impartiality. But maximin is no different from utilitarianism in these respects. It is *not* plausible as a non-instrumental egalitarian position in the sense I am concerned with in this essay. It does not express a distinctive thoroughgoing commitment to equality as comparability.

We have distinguished many different kinds of egalitarian positions: equality as universality, equality as impartiality, equality as comparability, instrumental egalitarianism, and non-instrumental egalitarianism. Having done this, in the remainder of this essay, I shall use the term *egalitarian* and its correlates to refer to those who share the deep thoroughgoing commitment to equality as comparability, and in particular to those who believe in the non-

instrumental value equality. So, for my purposes, egalitarians believe that how people fare relative to others has independent moral significance, and in particular, they believe that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Naturally, those who wish to continue to use the term *egalitarian* to refer to other positions may legitimately do so, but it is important not to conflate distinct positions.

C. I have claimed that a principle of equality as comparability is one whose principal concern is with how people fare *relative to others* and which regards it as bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. I have also claimed that only non-instrumental egalitarianism conflicts with the central tenet of non-egalitarianism. Many have wondered how there *could* be anything bad about inequality *itself*, over and above the extent to which it affects other ideals. Notoriously, egalitarians are accused of engaging in the “politics of envy,” as if only envy could account for a concern with how people fare *relative to others*, rather than a concern with how people fare. In addition, many wonder about the relevance of the “no fault or choice of their own” clause. After all, if inequality really is bad “in itself,” what difference does it make how it comes about?

These worries raise a host of important questions. Unfortunately, I can only say a few words about each. Let me begin by carefully interpreting, or qualifying, my claim that inequality is bad “in itself.” If I give one piece of candy to Andrea, and two to Rebecca, Andrea will immediately assert “unfair!” This natural reaction suggests that equality is intimately connected with notions of fairness. I say “intimately connected with” advisedly. On my view, equality is a subtopic of the more general—and even more complex—topic of fairness. Specifically, concern about inequality is that portion of our concern about fairness that focuses on how people fare relative to others. So, our concern for equality is not separable from our concern for a certain aspect of fairness; they are part and parcel of a single concern. We say that certain inequalities are objectionable because they are unfair; but by the same token, we say that there is a certain kind of unfairness in being worse off than another through no fault or choice of one’s own.

This explains the importance of the “no fault or choice” clause. Egalitarians are not committed to the view that deserved inequalities—if there are any—are as bad as undeserved ones. In fact, I think deserved inequalities are not bad *at all*. Rather, what

is objectionable is some being worse off than others *through no fault or choice of their own*. The reason for this is simple. *Undeserved* inequality is unfair, but *deserved* inequality is not.

The egalitarian is *not* committed to the implausible view that it is bad for parents or citizens to freely and rationally sacrifice for their descendants so that their descendants will be better off than they. Nor is the egalitarian committed to the implausible view that it is bad for imprisoned criminals to be worse off than regular citizens, *if* the egalitarian believes that the criminal could have been as well off as others, but freely and rationally chose a life of crime. In such cases, the unequal outcomes are not unfair, and hence not objectionable, because the worse-off are so by their own free choice. These cases presumably differ from those where the worse-off are so because they were unlucky enough to be born into poverty, or with severe handicaps, or with the “wrong” color skin in a racist society.

The preceding reminds us that egalitarians are not simply concerned with *how much* inequality obtains, they are concerned with how *bad* the inequality is. Thus, while there may be *more* inequality in one situation than another, that needn't be *worse* if the greater inequality is deserved, but the lesser is not.

In thinking about this it helps to remember a simple point. Inequality is rampant in the universe. There are more electrons than protons, more roaches than whales, more numbers than mountains. These inequalities are real. But they are merely factual, descriptive, or arithmetical inequalities. Of the innumerable descriptive inequalities, only a few have normative significance. Egalitarians may argue as to which inequalities have normative significance, or whether some inequalities are more significant than others. But they can agree, I think, that only undeserved inequalities matter.

It is, of course, *extremely* difficult to decide when people *are* worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Egalitarians tend to think this is often, or nearly always, the case. Non-egalitarians tend to think this is rarely, if ever, the case. This raises enormous practical and theoretical issues for egalitarians. But it is important to distinguish the difficulty of determining when inequalities are undeserved from the crucial normative question of whether only undeserved inequalities are objectionable. It is an interesting question to what extent debates between people who think of themselves as egalitarians or non-egalitarians actually turn on whether prevalent inequalities, such as those produced under capitalism, are undeserved.

Are egalitarians necessarily envious? Are they “maliciously covetous or resentful of the possessions or good fortune of another” (as *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* defines the term “envious”)? Surely not. When an egalitarian condemns past inequalities between clan leaders and their followers, or servants, she is not “maliciously covetous” or “resentful” of the clan leader’s possessions or good fortune. Indeed, she may well believe, rightly, that she is *much* better off than the clan leader ever was. Nevertheless, she believes it is bad—because unfair—for some to be much worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Thus, the egalitarian’s judgment is not motivated by *envy*, but by a sense of *fairness*. At least, I believe that is what an egalitarian’s judgment should be motivated by, whether considering other societies or one’s own.

D. Milton Friedman reputedly claimed that people can serve only one master, and that master is freedom. Those sharing Friedman’s view that the true, or correct, moral theory must be *monistic*—that there can be one and only one “true” moral ideal—often argue against equality by appealing to examples like the following.

Imagine two alternative outcomes, A and B. A and B are each perfectly equal outcomes, that is, within each outcome each person would be as well off as every other. However, those in A would all be *much* better off than those in B in terms of resources, welfare, freedom, opportunity, etc.

Surely, A is a better outcome than B, since everyone in A is equally well off, and much better off than those in B. However, A is *not* better than B regarding equality; they are equivalent, since, by hypothesis, both are perfect regarding equality.

Monistic egalitarians—those who believed that equality was the *only* moral value—would have no reason to prefer A to B. But this, we agree, is implausible. A *is* better than B. But what does this show? All it shows is that if we are egalitarians we should be *pluralists*. We should admit that equality is not our only ideal, that it is but one, among others, that we value. Correspondingly, we should distinguish between our “purely” egalitarian judgments—our judgments about how situations compare regarding equality, and hence the judgments we would make *if* equality *were* our only concern—and our *all things considered* judgments—our judgments about how situations compare after giving each ideal its due weight.

If we were committed to moral monism, arguments such as the preceding would successfully undermine egalitarianism. (Though

the stubborn monistic egalitarian could, of course, implausibly insist that there *is* nothing to choose between A and B, since inequality *is* all that matters.) But there is little reason to believe moral monism is true, and good reason to believe it is false.

Equality is not the only ideal that would, if exclusively pursued, have implausible or even terrible implications. The same is true of justice, utility, freedom, and probably every other ideal. Recall Kant's view that "justice be done though the heavens should fall." Do we really think, with Kant, that it would be wrong to falsely imprison an innocent man for even five minutes, if that were necessary to save 1,000,000 innocent lives? Or consider the principle of utility, which would require us to torture an innocent person if only *enough* people had their lives improved by the tiniest of amounts because of our action. Or finally, consider the implications of unfettered freedom to act as one wants without government interference, as long as one doesn't interfere with the rights or liberties of others. Such a principle could allow *complete* neglect of the least fortunate, even regarding basic necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare. Considerations such as these do not show that each of these moral ideals should be rejected, only that morality is complex.

As noted, one of the most widely debated issues among egalitarians concerns what *kind* of equality is desirable. This issue is extremely important, both practically and theoretically. Clearly, different outcomes or choices will seem better or worse regarding equality, depending on what kind of inequality one is concerned with. Moreover, one must be particularly careful in determining what kind of inequality matters, since, as has long been recognized, equality of one kind will often require inequality of another. For example, equality of income may correlate with inequality of need satisfaction between the handicapped and the healthy, and vice versa. Similarly, in many circumstances equality of opportunity may correlate with inequality of welfare, and vice versa.

Many assume that concern for one kind of equality rules out concern for others. Correspondingly, philosophers favoring different conceptions of what kind of equality matters have gone to great lengths illustrating cases where rival conceptions have implausible implications. Unfortunately, on a pluralistic view of morality the assumption in question is dubious. Perhaps different kinds of equality matter in different contexts. Or perhaps even in the same context there are strong reasons for promoting different kinds of equality. Thus, the question "equality of what?" may have several plausible answers.

As we have just seen, the fact that ideals like equality, utility, or freedom sometimes have implausible, or even terrible, implications, does *not* show that those ideals do not matter. It merely shows that each ideal, alone, is not *all* that matters. Likewise, the fact that different conceptions of what kind of equality matters sometimes have implausible implications does not necessarily show that those conceptions do not matter. Equality, like morality itself, is complex. And more than one conception may be relevant to our “all things considered” egalitarian judgments.

My own view is that a large component of the egalitarian’s concern should be with equality of *welfare*; but as I use it “welfare” is a technical term that needs to be interpreted broadly, and with great care. It must appropriately include, among other things, most of the elements that Amartya Sen carefully distinguishes in his sophisticated account of functionings, capability sets, freedom, agency, and well-being.⁶ However, I also think the egalitarian should give weight to equality of opportunity.

Suppose, for example, that we lived in a world not too unlike the actual one, in which a relatively small percentage of people were very well off, while the vast majority were much worse off. Concern for equality of welfare would impel us to raise everyone to the level of the best-off. But suppose, for empirical reasons of limited resources, this were not possible. Concern for equality of welfare might then impel us to redistribute from the better-off to the worse-off. But if the percentage of better-off were small, this might do little to actually improve the lot of the worse-off, its main effect might be to reduce the better-off to the level of the worse-off. Even if we think this *would* be an improvement regarding equality of welfare, we might agree it would *not* be an improvement all things considered. Thus, we might conclude that in such a case we must accept, even if not happily, a *significantly* unequal situation regarding welfare.

Still, we might distinguish two versions of this scenario. In one version, the better-off group are members of a hereditary aristocracy. They, and their descendants, have been guaranteed a place in the better-off group. Likewise, the members of the worse-off group, and their descendants, are destined to remain in the worse-off group regardless of their abilities or efforts. In the second version there is genuine equality of opportunity. At birth, each person, and her descendants, has an equal chance of ending up in the better-off group.

By hypothesis, the two versions of the scenario are equivalent regarding equality of welfare. Yet, I think many would agree the

second is better than the first all things considered, and better largely, if not wholly, because it is better regarding equality of opportunity. I think, then, that *qua* egalitarian, one should care about equality of opportunity. But this concern should be *in addition to*, rather than *in place of*, a concern for equality of welfare. The second situation may be *perfect* regarding equality of opportunity—but it still involves many people who are worse off than others through no choice of their own. The egalitarian, *qua* egalitarian, will regard this as objectionable. It would be better, regarding equality, if, in addition to everyone having equal *opportunities*, they actually fared equally well.

Does the egalitarian have to make room in her spectrum of concerns for other kinds of equality? Perhaps, but I am inclined to think that, *theoretically* at least, the plausible elements of most other kinds of equality will be captured by a sufficiently sophisticated interpretation of welfare. Still, in the real world it may be extremely difficult or undesirable to pursue equality of welfare, for a host of political, practical, and moral reasons. Given this, it may well be better to pursue equality of other kinds, such as income, resources, primary goods, or need satisfaction. However, we must be careful to distinguish our ultimate reasons for advocating one kind of equality over another. There may well be a difference between the option that is most desirable, from an egalitarian perspective, and the option that is most desirable or feasible all things considered, and we must not fool ourselves that the latter is necessarily the same as the former.

Part II

The considerations in this part are addressed to those who accept non-instrumental egalitarianism. I claimed that according to this position it is bad—because unfair—for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Unfortunately, as we shall see next, it is one thing to note such a position, quite another to accurately interpret it, or unpack what it involves.

As noted, most philosophical discussions of equality have focused on two questions: Is equality really desirable? And what kind of equality should we seek? These are important questions. But egalitarians must address a slew of other questions as well, including, but by no means are limited to, the following: When is one situation worse than another regarding inequality? Does inequality matter between groups, or between individuals? Does in-

equality matter differently at high levels than low levels? Is inequality affected by variations in population size? If one compares individuals with respect to inequality, should one focus on their lives taken as complete wholes, on contemporaneous portions of their lives—say, the elderly of today with the youth of today—or on corresponding segments of their lives—say, the elderly of today with the elderly of tomorrow?

Those who believe that inequality matters must ultimately address each of these questions, and others as well. After all, it does no good to claim that inequality matters, if one cannot determine what factors affect inequality and whether one situation is worse than another regarding inequality. I believe the answers to the preceding questions are not only interesting and important, in many cases they are perplexing, disturbing, and controversial. They have significant implications not only for our understanding of equality, but for our understanding of morality itself, including the structure and relation of our moral ideals. Unfortunately, I cannot defend these claims here. Instead, I wish to present a brief overview of a few conclusions I have arrived at in thinking about these questions, and convey some sense for the kinds of considerations underlying my thinking.

Most of this part will discuss the general question, “when is one situation worse than another regarding inequality?” This is my book’s central question, and it is one that led me both to develop a new approach to understanding inequality, and to consider the other, more specific, questions. After discussing the general question, I shall briefly comment on the other questions noted above. For the interested reader, extensive arguments are available in *Inequality*.⁷

A. When is one situation worse than another regarding inequality? In some cases the answer to this question can be easily given. We know, for instance, that among equally deserving people a situation where some are worse off than others is worse than one where everyone is equal, in terms of inequality. We also know that among equally deserving people the inequality in a situation would be worse if the gaps between the better- and worse-off were large, than if they were small. Consider, however, a situation where many are better-off, and a few are worse-off. How would the inequality in such a situation compare to the inequality in a situation where a few are better-off and many are worse-off? How would both of these compare to a situation where the better- and worse-off groups were similar in size? It turns out that these are com-

plicated questions, and ones to which several plausible but conflicting answers might be given.

For example, one way we may judge inequality is in terms of how “gratuitous” the inequality seems. Consider a situation where many are better-off, and only a few are worse-off. Call this *the first situation*. In such a situation the inequality may seem “pointless and unnecessary.” If direct redistribution were possible to bring about equality, the better-off would hardly lose anything and the worse-off would gain tremendously. Hence, the inequality in the first situation may seem particularly offensive as there seems to be virtually nothing gained by it.

Next consider the situation where half of the people are better-off, and half are worse-off. Call this *the middle situation*. It seems that in the middle situation redistribution would “cost” a lot. A large number would have to sacrifice a great deal to achieve equality. In such a situation, we could understand the reluctance of the better-off to redistribute, and while we might think it would be good if they were to voluntarily do this, we might not think they were morally *required* to do this. In that situation, then, the inequality might strike us as more excusable, and hence less disturbing, than the inequality in the first situation.

Finally, consider a situation where only a few are better-off, and the vast majority are worse-off. Call this *the last situation*. In the last situation direct redistribution from better- to worse-off would involve tremendous loss for some, with virtually no gain for those thus “benefited.” Therefore, the inequality might seem least offensive in the last situation, where the “cost” of the inequality might seem smallest, and the “gain” highest.

This position might be summed up as follows. Egalitarians will think it unfair if, through no fault or choice of their own, some are badly-off (e.g., struggling to survive) while others are well-off (e.g., living lives of ease and comfort). But from one perspective, at least, egalitarians may be most offended if just a few are badly-off while the vast majority are well-off, since the inequality then seems particularly gratuitous. Thus, in accordance with this way of thinking, it will seem that the three situations are getting *better and better* regarding inequality.

Another reason egalitarians may think the three situations are getting better and better is that it appears to be less and less the case that those who are worse-off are being especially victimized by the situation. In the first situation, for instance, it is as if the entire burden of the inequality is borne by those few who are unfortunate enough to be among the worse-off. Given that those

few people are much worse off than *every other* member of their world, it may seem that they have a very large complaint regarding inequality, and correspondingly, that the inequality is especially offensive. By contrast, the last situation's inequality may seem relatively inoffensive. In that situation each member of the worse-off group is as well off as *all* but a *few* of the other members of her world. Hence, in that world it may seem as if nobody has much to complain about regarding inequality.

This view is plausible, and it expresses itself in the way we react to the actions of bullies or tyrants. If a bully or tyrant decides to humiliate certain people, from a utilitarian standpoint we may well hope that it is a small portion of the population that is so mistreated. Nevertheless, from an egalitarian standpoint we may well find the mistreatment most offensive if it applies to only a small segment of the population. Thus, it may seem particularly unfair for a few people to bear the brunt of their world's unfairness; and it may seem especially galling that the vast majority should be leading normal happy lives, while one small segment of it gets "crushed beneath the heel of oppression."

One way of putting this point is that certain egalitarian intuitions are especially attuned to instances of invidious or capricious discrimination where a particular person or small number of people is *singled* out for discriminatory treatment. In fact, I think it is the *singling out* in this way of an individual or small number that is the paradigmatic case of where we judge a (harmful) discrimination to be grossly unfair.

I suspect this element of our thinking may be one of the reasons it has taken many people so long to recognize pervasive discrimination against women. Even though women were (and still are) being treated very differently than men, half of the population was being treated in the same way. Because of this, and because of the fact that certain of our egalitarian intuitions are especially attuned to discrimination against individuals and small numbers, it was easy for both men and women to realize that women were being treated differently, and yet fail to recognize that women were actually being *discriminated* against.

There are, then, several ways of thinking that might lead one to think the three situations are getting better and better regarding inequality. But there are also ways of thinking that might lead one to judge that the situations first get worse, then better. It is easy to be drawn to such an ordering by reasoning as follows. In the first situation, everyone is perfectly equal except, regrettably, for a few isolated individuals. In that situation, then,

the worse-off represent an ever-so-slight perturbation in an otherwise perfectly homogeneous system. Therefore, since in the first situation there is just a slight deviation from absolute equality that situation may seem nearly perfect regarding inequality. In the middle situation, the deviation from absolute equality is much larger. *Half* the population is much better off than the other half. In the last situation, there is once again just an ever-so-slight deviation from absolute equality. Everyone is perfectly equal except, regrettably, for a few isolated individuals. Like the first situation, therefore, that world may appear almost perfect regarding inequality. In sum, it seems there is a natural and plausible way of looking at the three situations such that we would judge they first get worse, then better.

Another line of thought also supports the “worse, then better” ordering. In the first situation, only a *few* people have a complaint regarding inequality, so as large as their complaint may be that situation’s inequality may not seem too bad. However, in the middle situation, it may seem *both* that a large number have a complaint (half of the population), *and* that the magnitude of their complaints will be large (they are, after all, worse off than half the population through no fault or choice of their own). In the last world, on the other hand, the situation may seem analogous to, though the reverse of, the one obtaining in the first. Although almost everyone has *something* to complain about, it may seem that the size of their complaints will be virtually negligible, as they are as well off as almost every other person in the situation. Hence, as with the first situation, the inequality may not seem too bad.

It seems, then, there are egalitarian reasons to rank the three situations as getting worse, then better, as well as reasons to rank them as just getting better. Still other reasons seem to support ranking them as getting worse and worse. In the first situation, only a few people are worse off than the better-off. In the middle situation, half the population are worse off than the better-off. In the last situation, virtually everybody is worse off than the better-off. Since the size of the gap between better- and worse-off is the same in each situation, we may conclude that the first situation is the best regarding inequality, and the last situation is worst.

Before going on, let me note two examples where such reasoning seems to be involved. First, if one asks audiences to think of the worst periods of inequality in human history—as I have many times over the years—one of the most common responses is that of medieval Europe. But the common conception of medieval

Europe involves a few—kings, queens, and noblemen—living in the lap of luxury while the vast majority—peasants and serfs—struggle to survive. Such a situation resembles the last situation, rather than the first or middle one. And while here, as elsewhere, I think people's intuitive responses may be partly influenced by non-egalitarian factors as well as various different egalitarian factors, I think *one* reason so many think of medieval Europe as among the worst periods of inequality is that the number of worse-off is so large relative to the fortunate few who are well off. This way of thinking is compatible with the judgment that the three situations are getting worse and worse, but not with the ways of thinking discussed previously.

Another example where such thinking seems operative is illustrated by a Marxian analysis of the advance of capitalism. On a Marxian view, as capitalism advances more and more people are squeezed out of the ranks of the bourgeoisie into the ranks of the proletariat; hence, fewer and fewer people come to reap the benefits of capitalism.

Now whatever one thinks of its ultimate accuracy, it must be admitted that as stories go a Marxian analysis of capitalism exerts a strong pull on one's egalitarian intuitions. Specifically, egalitarians would find advancing capitalism increasingly objectionable for (at least) two reasons: first, because the rich become richer and the poor (at least relatively) poorer; and second, because the ranks of the worse-off swell and the ranks of the better-off shrink. It is the latter point that concerns us here. It suggests that certain egalitarian intuitions will be increasingly offended as more and more people are worse-off relative to the better-off. These intuitions support the judgment that the three situations are getting worse and worse.

This discussion has been vastly oversimplified. But I hope to have conveyed some sense for why I claim inequality is complex. There are many different positions, or aspects, capable of underlying and influencing our egalitarian judgments. In fact, in my book I argue there are at least twelve such aspects. I do not claim each of these aspects is equally appealing. But I do believe each represents elements of the egalitarian's thinking that are not easily dismissed.

Given that equality's different aspects often diverge in the judgments they yield, and that, on examination, many apparently rest on contrary views, one may come to conclude that the notion of equality is largely inconsistent and severely limited. Alternatively, one may try to maintain that it is complex, multi-faceted, and

partially incomplete. Either way, once one understands what the notion of equality involves, many of one's common-sense judgments about equality will need to be revised.

Reflecting on considerations like the preceding, led me to develop a new way of thinking about inequality. The common view is that the notion of inequality is simple, holistic, and essentially distributive. This view is thoroughly misleading—the notion of inequality is complex, individualistic, and essentially comparative. Let me briefly explain.

Simple versus complex. People have long recognized that there are complicated issues *connected* with inequality, such as whether inequality is truly undesirable, and if so, with respect to what. Still, most have thought the notion of inequality *itself* is simple. We *all* know what equality is, it has been thought, that's where everybody has the same amount of x (for whatever x we are interested in). Similarly, we *all* know what inequality is, that's where some have more x than others. What could be simpler? Thus, it has been assumed that once we determine with respect to what, if anything, we should care about inequality, it will be easy to rank situations regarding inequality.

As we have seen, there is reason to reject this. Inequality is very complex, as many aspects with different implications underlie and influence our egalitarian judgments.

Holistic versus individualistic. Most who learn that I work on inequality immediately ask something like the following: "inequality between whom: blacks and whites, women and men, Americans and Ethiopians, or homosexuals and heterosexuals?" The assumption is that the egalitarian should be concerned about (in-)equality between *groups* or *societies*.

Again, there are powerful reasons to question this assumption. The notion of inequality has a strong *individualistic* component. Looking at situations we are capable of making judgments as to which individuals fare better or worse regarding inequality. Thus, for any situation where some are better off than others through no fault or choice of their own, we can say that the best-off have nothing to complain about regarding inequality—since they are already as well off as every other member of their situation—while the worst-off have the most to complain about regarding inequality—since, by hypothesis, they are worse off than every other member of their situation. Moreover, on reflection, not only can we make judgments about how different individuals fare with respect to inequality, but our overall judgments regarding inequality are generally based on how individuals fare regarding inequality.

In addition, it seems clear that *groups* or *societies* aren't the proper objects of moral concern, *individuals* are. Thus, although different individuals or social institutions often discriminate against groups, and though, for political and practical reasons we may need to focus on groups in responding to such discrimination, our *ultimate* concern is for the individual members of the affected groups.

While on average whites may be much better off than blacks, some blacks will be much better off than others, and some whites will be much worse off than some blacks. Correspondingly, insofar as one is concerned about inequality, one will favor transfers from better-off whites to worse-off blacks, but should oppose transfers (except, perhaps, for indirect long term reasons) from worse-off whites to better-off blacks. Likewise, one should favor transfers from better-off blacks to worse-off blacks, or for that matter, from better-off blacks to worse-off whites. Similarly, for the case of men and women, or other cases of general inequality between groups or societies.

Essentially distributive versus *essentially comparative*. I agree that the egalitarian is not merely concerned with *how much* good obtains, but with how the good is distributed. But, fundamentally, the concern for equality is not so much *essentially* distributive, as it is *essentially comparative*. Equality is a *relation* between individuals and, as previously suggested, the egalitarian's fundamental concern is with how individuals fare *relative to each other*.

B. Does inequality matter more at high levels or low levels? This is a question about which there has been much confusion. Some argue that inequality matters more at high levels than low levels because they think that only at high levels can one "afford the luxury" of equality. So, for example, they point out that in a situation of *extreme* scarcity, inequality might allow some to live, while perfect equality might result in everyone dying. Others argue that inequality matters the same at high and low levels. They claim that whether one is at level 1,000 or level 1,000,000 makes no difference to how bad it would be to be worse off than another by 1,000 units, since in each case it would take an increase of the same amount—namely 1,000—to make you equal with the other. In addition, many economists' measures of inequality are indifferent between proportional increases in people's levels. So, on those measures, the inequality between someone at level 1 and someone at level 10 would be just as bad as the inequality between someone at level 100 and someone at level 1000. Economists have as-

sumed these so-called “mean-independent” measures of inequality are *neutral* with respect to whether inequality matters more at high or low levels, and debated the desirability of this feature.

All these views are mistaken. The first conflates an all things considered judgment with an egalitarian one. All things considered, a perfectly equal situation where everybody *dies* will be much worse than an unequal situation where some live and others die, but surely this doesn’t show that the inequality in the latter situation doesn’t *matter*! The inequality in the latter situation involves a difference measured in terms of life’s necessities, it involves a difference, quite literally, between who lives and who dies. The person who responds to such a situation with the truism “whoever said that life is *fair*?” acknowledges, even in his cynicism, the egalitarian’s basic view of the situation. For the egalitarian, if the people are equally deserving such inequality is *very* bad, and it matters a great deal. Still, as bad as the inequality is, if the cost of removing it is that everyone die, even the egalitarian can admit—as a pluralist—that the cost is too high.

The second view conflates a *descriptive* question, how *much* inequality obtains, with a *normative* question, how bad is the inequality. In a sense, of course, there is the same *amount* of inequality in the two described cases. In each someone is 1000 units worse off than another. But a person at level 1,000 fares much worse *relative to* someone at level 2,000, than does someone at level 1,000,000 *relative to* someone at level 1,001,000. The first person has only 33 per cent of what there is to be shared, and is only 50 per cent as well off as the better-off person. The second person has 49.98 per cent of what there is to be shared, and is 99.9 per cent as well off as the better-off person. Clearly, insofar as one is concerned with how people fare *relative to others*, the first person fares worse than the second.

Such considerations suggest that inequality matters *more* at low levels than high levels, in the sense that regarding inequality, it is worse for someone to be worse off than another by a certain amount if that person is poorly off than if that person is well off.

As for the third view, economists were mistaken in thinking that mean-independent measures were *neutral* regarding the question of whether inequality matters more at high or low levels. On a mean-independent measure, to be 9 units worse off than another if one is at level 1 is as bad as being 900 units worse off than another if one is at level 100. So, on a mean-independent measure inequality matters much more at low levels than high levels. The problem is that it matters *too* much more. To be worse

than another by 9 units matters more if one is at level 1 than if one is at level 100, but it doesn't matter 100 times more!

C. Does variation in population size affect inequality? Most economists and others assume that mere proportional increases in a population's size would not affect inequality. On this view, if the *pattern* of inequality is the same in two situations, it doesn't matter how many people are actually in the better- and worse-off groups. This position has great plausibility, and it is supported by numerous important aspects of inequality. Ultimately, however, this position needs revision. If it is genuinely bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own, then the more people there are who are in such a position the worse the situation should be.

One way of putting this point is as follows. In general, numbers count. This is true in most spheres of life, and morality is no exception to it. Moreover, it is not only true for utilitarians, it is true for most who employ moral ideals in the assessment of outcomes. Other things equal, more pains are worse than fewer pains, more infringements of liberty are worse than fewer infringements of liberty, more injustices or inequalities are worse than fewer injustices or inequalities. Even deontologists can accept such claims (though they deny that what we ought, morally, to *do*, is always to maximize the good or minimize wrong doing).

Not everyone accepts the view that numbers count in the moral realm.⁸ But most do. And I think they are right in doing so.

Some will insist that while numbers count for certain moral ideals, such as utility, they do not count for equality. They will insist that equality and utility are different *kinds* of moral ideals and that the two ideals can, and should, be treated differently. On this view, the fact that numbers count regarding ideals like utility is completely irrelevant to—i.e. suggests *nothing* about—whether numbers count regarding equality.

This contention has some plausibility, but ultimately I think it should be rejected. As I argue in my book, it turns out that different moral ideals cannot be fully and adequately characterized in isolation from each other. Specifically, a plausible and coherent account of the role moral ideals play in relation to each other and our all things considered judgments may require at least some ideals to share certain formal or structural features. In particular, if we want to hold on to the view that numbers count regarding utility, we may also have to hold that numbers count regarding equality, if we want to avoid inconsistency in our all things con-

sidered judgments. The argument for this is interesting, and ultimately has implications that extend far beyond the topic of equality. Unfortunately, I cannot pursue it here.

D. In comparing individuals with respect to inequality should one focus on their lives taken as complete wholes? Most discussions of equality, as well as other ideals such as Rawls's maximin principle, have implicitly assumed that the proper unit of moral concern should be individual lives taken as complete wholes. Following a fascinating article by Dennis McKerlie,⁹ I reject this position.

Consider the following example. Suppose that God has two faithful servants, Job₁ and Job₂. Suppose each is equally deserving in all respects, yet for 40 years Job₁'s life has been filled with all the blessings that life can bestow, while Job₂'s life has been one of continuous wretched misery. If we questioned God about treating two equally deserving people so *grossly* unequally, would an adequate response be that during the second 40 years of their lives their situations would be reversed, so that in fact the overall quality of their lives, taken as a whole, would be *completely equal*?

Analogously, do we think there would be no egalitarian objection to a caste system involving substantial differential treatment of caste members, as long as the demographic composition of the castes changed periodically so that each person was a member of each caste and the *overall* quality of each life was equivalent?

I believe the answer to both these questions should be "No." I reject the implication of whole lives egalitarianism that there can be no objection to a situation involving vast inequalities between equally deserving people—no matter how significant, sustained, widespread, systematic, and even perverse those inequalities were—as long as the roles of the equally deserving individuals were interchanged so that each receives an equivalent share of the different experiences.

Does this mean that we should reject whole lives egalitarianism and replace it entirely with some alternative? No. Once again, equality is a complex ideal. Besides focusing on complete lives, inequality might be measured by comparing *simultaneous*, or overlapping, segments of people's lives—for example, by directly comparing the current lives of aged A and youthful B, or by comparing *corresponding* segments of people's lives—for example, aged A's youth, with B's youth. In fact, I believe that each of these views is plausible in some cases, and implausible in others.

These different views have practical significance. For example, many would urge transfers from the young to the elderly partly on egalitarian grounds—since the elderly are often much worse off than the young due to losses of health and loved ones. But while many of today's elderly are currently worse off than many of today's youth in terms of the simultaneous segments of their lives, it is much less clear that they are worse off in terms of the corresponding segments of their lives, or taking their lives as complete wholes. Thus, it may make a substantial difference to the nature and extent of our obligations to the elderly, which views we accept, or how we weight them relative to each other.

E. Let me conclude this part by discussing a possible implication of my work that is both surprising and somewhat dismaying.

Unfortunately, the real world resembles the third kind of situation discussed earlier. A relatively small percentage are well off, while the vast majority fare poorly. In addition, a combination of moral, political, and practical considerations make it extremely unlikely that we will raise most of the worse-off to the level of the better-off, or that the better-off will substantially sacrifice their well-being so as to benefit the worse-off. This raises the worry that practically, perhaps the most we can hope for in the foreseeable future is that the better-off will make some small sacrifices enabling some of the worse-off to raise themselves to the level of the better-off. That is, one might worry that for the foreseeable future, perhaps the most we might reasonably hope for would be to transform our world from one resembling the last situation I discussed, to one resembling the middle situation, where a fairly large percentage of people are better off, though a fairly large percentage remain worse-off.

Unfortunately, it is unclear that this would be an improvement regarding *equality*. To the contrary, it is almost certain that when one fully takes into account each of equality's plausible aspects a situation like the middle one will be *worse* regarding *equality* than one like the last one. After all, in the middle situation *half* the population is much worse off than the other half through no fault or choice of their own, while in the last one *most* of the people are equal, but a fortunate few are better-off.

If the foregoing were the implication of my view, would it mean that we should oppose programs aimed at improving the lot of the worse-off? Certainly not. But it suggests that we would have to rethink the grounds of such programs, and the extent of our commitment to non-instrumental egalitarianism in the face of other

competing ideals. Most programs benefiting the worse-off have been defended largely in the name of equality. Yet, if the situation were as described, the effect of some such programs would be, at least for the foreseeable future, to *worsen* inequality, not improve it.

I mention the foregoing, because it is important in assessing the relative strength of our commitment to moral ideals to squarely face their unpalatable implications. However, it is unclear whether egalitarianism would actually have the implications noted. Thus, it has been claimed that a mere half of one percent of the income of the top 20% of income earners, would be more than sufficient to double the income of *everyone* in the bottom 20% of income earners. Even more strikingly, perhaps, it has been claimed that “The additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal access to basic education for all, basic health care for all, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food for all and safe water and sanitation for all is ... less than 4% of the combined wealth of the 225 richest people in the world.”¹⁰ Together, these considerations suggest that the egalitarian could clearly and unequivocally favor relatively small losses to the better off so as to achieve substantial gains for all of the worse off. The worry that for the foreseeable future we may only be able to benefit a relatively few while per force leaving most behind, may be moot.

In sum, arguments for effective transfers from the very best off to the world’s worse off may, indeed, be justified on egalitarian grounds, as has long been supposed. Still, we must be alert to the possibility that in some cases effective efforts to improve some of the world’s worse off might actually worsen inequality not improve it. This might be so if most of the worse off are left behind, so in essence we would be transforming our world from one resembling the last situation I discussed into one more resembling the middle situation.

Conclusion

In my book, I discussed at some length a position I then called *extended humanitarianism*, and which I now call *prioritarianism*.¹¹ On this view, one wants each person to fare as well as possible, but is especially concerned with—and hence gives extra weight or priority to—the worse-off. I argued that many people mistake prioritarianism for egalitarianism, and that while prioritarianism is a plausible position in its own right, it is a non-starter as a non-instrumental egalitarian position.

Roger Crisp accepted my claims, alas, with a bit too much enthusiasm. At the end of a generous review of my book in the *Times Literary Supplement*, Crisp wrote “The clarity of Temkin’s distinction between genuine [non-instrumental] egalitarianism and extended humanitarianism [prioritarianism] marks the end of egalitarianism as a coherent political doctrine.”

I hope Crisp is mistaken, since I believe there is an important place for equality in our pantheon of moral ideals. But even if, as I believe, egalitarianism remains as a coherent practical doctrine, I think it is extremely important for people to accurately recognize its nature, scope, and implications. The common tendency to argue about virtually every major social and political issue largely in egalitarian terms, especially in the absence of a clear understanding of the full complexity of the notion and its implications, does a disservice to both many pressing issues *and* the ideal of equality.

NOTES

1. This essay was originally written as an invited paper, delivered at the American Political Science Association Meeting in San Francisco in the summer of 1996.
2. Oxford University Press, 1993.
3. *Inequality Reexamined*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p. ix.
4. The substance of this view has been held by many philosophers over the years. But in this formulation it has been powerfully championed, and come to be associated with, Ronald Dworkin (see, for example, *Taking Rights Seriously*, Harvard University Press, 1978).
5. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1971.
6. See *Inequality Reexamined*, and also Sen’s “Well-being, Agency, and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984.” *Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985): 169–220.
7. Oxford University Press, 1993.
8. John Taurek explicitly denies that numbers should count in his rich and widely discussed article “Should the Numbers Count?” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (1977): 293–316.
9. “Equality and Time.” *Ethics* 99 (1989): 475–91.
10. I am most grateful to Thomas Pogge for sending me this quotation as well as defending the claim made in the previous sentence (personal correspondence). Pogge cites the United Nations’ *Human Development Report*, 1998, p. 30, as the source of the quote, and based his calculation about incomes on other information contained in the Report. Pogge’s observations considerably weaken the force of the worries expressed in the preceding paragraphs.
11. See my “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection,” in *The Ideal of Equality*, eds. Clayton, Matthew and Williams, Andrew, Macmillan Press

Ltd and St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 126–161. Derek Parfit has called the position in question the *Priority View* (first in his unpublished manuscript, “On Giving Priority to the Worse-off,” 1989, and later in his Lindley Lecture “Equality or Priority?” The University of Kansas, 1991.) Since Parfit's terminology has some advantages and has largely taken hold, I have amended my terminology accordingly. However, I might note that while Parfit is widely credited with launching the equality versus priority debate, my initial discussion of extended humanitarianism—which makes many points Parfit is credited with—first appeared in chapter six of my 1983 Princeton University PhD thesis, *Inequality*. This chapter was completed seven years earlier than Parfit's widely circulated and cited 1989 draft, “On Giving Priority to the Worse-off.”